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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF NON-
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE 
Faisal I. Chaudhry* 
This Article reconsiders the drugs-for-the-developing world 
debate that has taken place in the shadow of free trade 
liberalization. For the last twenty years, this debate has centered on 
a supposedly zero-sum conflict between access to drugs for 
residents of the “third world” and incentives for pharmaceutical 
multinationals to invest in research and development. Underlying 
this debate is the assumption that the developing-world health crisis 
involves primarily a crisis of infectious disease. Because drugs for 
such ailments lack developed world markets, it is easy to imagine 
that robust pharmaceutical patents are globally necessary if the 
poor are to obtain any drugs at all. Global public health reality, 
however, is quite different. Mortality and morbidity in developing 
countries are increasingly attributable to those same non-
communicable diseases (“NCDs”) that plague developed countries. 
Drugs for such conditions already have highly profitable developed 
world markets. Therefore, making developing-world populations 
pay patent-inflated prices encourages rent-seeking by 
multinationals rather than incentivization. While little noticed in the 
developed world, the importance of the NCD crisis has not been lost 
on developing world actors. This Article is the first to document a 
recent worldwide trend of developing-world courts and 
administrative agencies breaking with strict patent rights for NCD 
drugs. It argues that attentive policy makers can seize the 
opportunity provided by the crisis that developed world populism is 
creating for liberalizing globalization. If renegotiating free trade is 
back on the agenda, they need only look to what developing 
countries have already been doing, at least in the realm of 
intellectual property rights. 
                                               
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, 
University of Arizona. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The populist upsurge of 2016 in the Atlantic world has brought 
many surprises; the election of Donald Trump in the United States 
and Britain’s vote to leave the European Union being two of the 
most visible. While the outcome of these developments is yet to be 
fully determined, it is obviously difficult to see them other than as 
signs of a crisis in the prevailing world order. As is the case with 
any crisis, however, its indicia may foretell unpredictable 
opportunities as well. Of course, the Trump administration’s 
immediate move to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP)1—international economic law’s most recent hope for 
advancing globalization—may foretell a slight adjustment rather 
than any real reversal to the liberalizing commitment. At the same 
time, whatever its source, greater attention to the possible inequities 
of the global trading system still portends more of a chance that the 
terms of free trade liberalization will be reconsidered than has been 
the case at any previous time in recent memory. 
Although many questions remain unanswered—including 
whether the Trump administration will end up simply pursuing a 
bilateral, rather than multilateral, version of the free trade status 
quo—some things are for certain. Among these certainties is that 
growing populist scrutiny of liberalizing free trade’s achievements 
has now dovetailed with a mounting concern in places like the U.S. 
and Britain over out-of-control pharmaceutical costs, a problem that 
had once seemed to plague health systems in the developing world 
alone. In the U.S., for example, consumer outrage reached its most 
fevered pitch amidst the dramatic 600% price increase in Mylan, 
N.V.’s EpiPen epinephrine auto-injector in the late summer of 
2016.2 At the very same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, 
Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) turned down Roche 
                                               
 1 For the origins of the TPP, see Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 
Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks 
and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 401 (2009). 
 2 The controversy elicited a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of Mylan 
N.V., which was settled in August, 2017, for $465 million. See Nate Raymond, 
Mylan, U.S. Finalize $465 Million EpiPen Settlement, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mylan-epipen/mylan-u-s-finalize-465-
million-epipen-settlement-idUSKCN1AX1RW. 
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Pharmaceutical’s blockbuster breast cancer therapy Kadcyla for the 
second time in two years.3 Running more than $100,000 per patient 
per year, the NHS declared the patent-protected drug simply too 
expensive,4 especially given Roche’s own cost of just over $100.5 
Of course, for those versed in the last twenty years of the debate 
pitting the need for essential medicines for the world’s poor against 
the intellectual property rights (“IP” or “IPRs”) of pharmaceutical 
multinationals, it may seem naïve to imagine that the actual cost of 
Kadcyla is so little. After all, such debate commenced from the clear 
support of our era’s foundational free trade agreement, the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), for the upward harmonization of 
national IPR standards.6 The WTO’s annex on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”)7 has thus supported 
strong patent rights in the name of enabling firms like those in the 
pharmaceutical sector to recoup the hundreds of millions, if not 
billions, of dollars they claim to spend on developing new 
medicines.8 Yet there remains an important difference between the 
                                               
 3 Kadcyla is the brand name for trastuzumab emtansine. As discussed in Part 
V, Roche has been involved in conflict over a patent on the unadorned form of 
trastuzumab, or Herceptin, in India. 
 4 John Ainger, Make Drugmakers Pay: England’s Strategy for Cancer 
Medicines, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/cancer-drugs-fund-
revamp-means-drugmakers-shoulder-overspending. 




 6 See Frederick M Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the 
World Economic System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 499 (1998). 
 7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 8 The most widely cited (and criticized) figures come from Tufts Center for the 
Study of Drug Development. The Center’s 2003 study reported the $800 million 
number (or $1 billion in 2013 dollars). That figure became $2.6 billion by the time 
the Center undertook its 2013 updated study. Although the 2014 study is 
inaccessible online, for the official summary, see Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. 
Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016). For concern about 
the study, see Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New Estimate 
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intensifying concern about drug costs in the “first world” and the 
standing debate about access to medicines in the “third world.” Even 
without the proprietary information required for a true accounting, 
the ordinary inhabitant of the developed world would still likely balk 
at such figures. Instead, inhabitants of the developed world would 
feel only vaguely trapped by dire warnings of a greater number of 
their countrymen left to die or suffer in a counterfactual world 
without any drugs at all, absent $99,000-plus markups. 
                                               
Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-of-
developing-a-new-drug.html?_r=1. See also MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 
MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004). More 
recently, dueling (and very different) estimates of R&D costs have emerged. See 
Joseph A. DiMasi, H.G. Grabowski & R.W. Hansen, Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 
(2016) (sampling 106 randomly selected drugs from ten large pharmaceutical 
firms to arrive at a total pre-approval cost estimate of $2.558 billion in 2013); 
Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring 
a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, JAMA: INTERNAL 
MED. (Sep. 11, 2017), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/ 
jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2653012 (using the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s reports for investors to arrive at total R&D figures for 
cancer drugs put out by ten companies in the period from 2007 to 2015 and finding 
a median cost of $648 million). For a discussion of limitations of DiMasi’s paper 
and problems accessing its underlying data, see James Love, Perspectives on 
Cancer Drug Development Costs in JAMA, HARV. L. BILL OF HEALTH (Sept. 13, 
2017), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2017/09/13/perspectives-on-cancer-
drug-development-costs-in-jama/. As Love notes, these various controversies 
about R&D costs are entirely aside from whether R&D outlays are even relevant 
to determining pharmaceutical prices, which a great deal of evidence suggests 
they are not, given that companies instead charge what they think the market can 
bear. As he notes, the back and forth also fails to give much attention to the 
misleading character of industry averages of R&D costs given how wide variation 
for different drugs tends to be. Love gives the example of Spinraza, a drug that 
runs up to $750,000 for one year’s course of treatment. He cites a study by 
Knowledge Ecology International, developed largely through government grants, 
calculating its risk-adjusted R&D costs at $40 million. Id. For the latter 
calculation, see Andrew Goldman, Written Submission in Support of HB 666, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.keionline.org/ 
sites/default/files/KEI-Goldman-HB666-transparency-16March2017-
Maryland.pdf. 
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The overall aim of this Article is to ask why such warnings seem 
much more compelling when thinking about illness in the 
developing world. The article’s answer is that such warnings have 
long taken on a surface plausibility for low and middle-income 
countries9 due to highly restricted assumptions about the diseases 
faced by these countries’ inhabitants. The public health crisis in the 
developing world has thus been construed largely, if not entirely, in 
terms of communicable or infectious diseases (like tuberculosis and 
malaria).10 From its very outset, the drugs-for-the-developing world 
debate involved both critics and supporters of TRIPS alike focused 
mainly on drugs for diseases that had no effective markets in high-
income countries (except for the unique case of HIV/AIDS).11 As a 
result, it has always implicitly drawn on fact scenarios that make 
choosing between competing normative considerations about 
ensuring access to drugs and incentivizing their production to seem 
like a zero-sum dilemma. 
In coming to my own normative argument, this Article 
highlights a shift now taking place in the nature of health crisis in 
the developing world. This involves non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) increasingly replacing infectious diseases as the highest 
cause of morbidity and mortality in low and middle-income 
countries. This shift is crucial because NCDs entail drugs that do 
have markets in the developed world and highly profitable markets 
by the multinational pharmaceutical sector’s own account.12 
                                               
 9 For simplicity’s sake, the term “low- and middle-income countries” is used 
equivalently with “developing countries/world.” For a proper description of these 
categories, see infra notes 60–61. 
 10 I will use the terms communicable disease and infectious disease 
interchangeably, though they have slightly different definitions. According to the 
World Health Organization (WHO), communicable diseases are generally those 
ailments that can be transmitted from person-to-person, while “[i]nfectious 
diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, 
parasites or fungi” and “can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to 
another.” Health Topics: Infectious Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
 11 For simplicity’s sake, the term “high-income countries” is used equivalently 
with “developed countries/world.” For a proper description of this category, see 
infra note 61. 
 12 For a more detailed discussion of these points, see infra Sections IV and V.  
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Developed world markets can amortize real research and 
development (R&D) costs. NCD drugs make it strikingly clear that, 
rather than being necessary to incentivize away from a world 
without medicines, pushing for patent-inflated pricing through the 
upward harmonization of a national IP regime design in developing 
countries is likely a form of rent-seeking. 
Our existing debate has obscured this reality through an 
ostensibly context-free mode of “in theory” argument (even as it has 
implicitly equated the problem of “third world” health with the 
impact of non-remunerative infectious disease). In the process, it has 
created the misleading sense that the normative aims of access and 
incentivization entail an imminent tradeoff. If we instead consider 
the growing NCD crisis the developing world is facing, we begin to 
see how legal and administrative conflicts in low and middle-
income countries have been shifting in recent years. Accordingly, 
this Article is the first of its kind to unveil how low and middle-
income countries have increasingly moved toward contesting strict 
patent rights on drugs for conditions like cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, and assorted chronic ailments. As I contend, this shift 
amounts to a wave of strategic action recalibrating focus onto those 
fact scenarios that are the least likely to trigger an imminent zero-
sum tradeoff between access and incentivization. 
Little-noticed by academics and policy makers in the developed 
world, both of these shifts—in the profile of disease burden and the 
pattern of legal/administrative conflict in the developing world—
have been afoot since 2010. Preceding the current populist upsurge 
for renegotiating the terms of free trade in places like the U.S. and 
Britain by more than a half-decade, these shifts furnish a ready 
template for law and policy makers to draw on when addressing the 
more specific questions they will now face about rewriting the rules 
of national IP regime design. Therefore, making sense of the shifting 
contexts that inform questions about pharmaceutical access versus 
incentivization in the way is of vital importance. This, moreover, is 
not simply with respect to the inhabitants of the developing world, 
but also to those outside of its borders—especially in the United 
States. If bipartisan action against out-of-control drug prices in the 
U.S. does materialize, opposition based on the supposed imminence 
of the access-incentivization dilemma will grow much louder. 
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To pursue its descriptive and normative goals, this Article 
proceeds in five parts. Part II previews the shifting landscape of 
conflict over IPRs and access to medicines. A landmark 2013 
decision is briefly discussed in which the Indian Supreme Court 
rejected the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis’ patent application 
for a prominent anti-cancer drug due to its lack of inventiveness. 
One of a growing number, the case is used as a launching point for 
the more telescopic perspective this Article provides. Part III turns 
to a brief historical account of how the remote theoretical tension 
between pharmaceutical access and incentivization became an 
urgent conundrum after the founding of the WTO. This tension grew 
in tandem with the rise of a debate on drugs-for-the-developing 
world rooted in concerns about TRIPS’ impact on the well-being of 
the world’s poor. Part IV examines the picture of the public health 
crisis in the developing world as an over-looked crisis of infectious 
disease; it also emphasizes the changing nature of illness in low and 
middle-income countries due to the (ongoing) explosion of health 
and economic loss from NCDs. Part V contemplates how, despite 
the ambiguities of normative IP theory and the place of patents in 
any country’s innovation system, the access-incentivization 
dilemma has nonetheless been further mapped onto a dichotomy 
between short-term ethics and the long-term rationality of 
economics. This section will describe how assuming a factual 
backdrop of infectious disease effectively buttressed the prevailing 
status quo in favor of strict approaches to patent rights and the 
upward harmonization of national IP regime design.13 Finally, Part 
VI documents the burgeoning examples, since 2010, of courts and 
administrative agencies developing countries engaging in new 
forms of strategic action to break with strict patent rights in the 
context of NCD drugs.  
                                               
 13 Here, “upward harmonization” means both a harmonization toward the new 
“minimum” standards of TRIPS that have been in place since the 1990s, as well 
as the ongoing push to make those standards more exacting. For more on the term 
“harmonization” as used in this context, see, for example, Amy Kapczynski, 
Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in 
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009). On efforts to 
render the TRIPS framework more stringent through the outright supplementation 
by so-called TRIPS-plus rules, see infra notes 41 and 51. 
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II. PRELUDE: THE GLEEVEC CASE IN INDIA 
We start with the most significant example of a developing 
country—India—breaking from strict IPR for NCD drugs in recent 
years. In 2013, after years of controversy, India’s Supreme Court 
upheld an administrative decision to deny Swiss Pharmaceutical 
giant Novartis a patent for Gleevec, a blockbuster cancer drug.14 
The patent for Gleevec’s underlying compound, known 
chemically as imatinib, was first filed in Switzerland in 1992.15 By 
1997, Novartis created the salt version of imatinib that was marketed 
as Gleevec.16 In 1998, it applied for a patent on Gleevec in India with 
the Chennai branch of the Indian Patent Office (IPO).17 As with the 
other controversies documented in Part V, the battle lines over 
Gleevec were drawn around the issue of whether the modifications 
Novartis made to the underlying compound made it a new 
invention.18 
When Novartis applied for protection in India, its IP laws 
allowed only for process patents.19 However, as an incoming WTO 
member state, India was required under TRIPS to also legalize 
product patents. After India passed relevant amendments to the India 
Patents Act in 2002 (and again in 2005), Novartis reapplied to the 
IPO for protection in 2005.20 
In January 2006, the IPO issued a series of orders responding to 
five separate pre-grant oppositions to Novartis’ application.21 Under 
                                               
 14 Novartis v. Union of India & Others, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India). 
 15 Archive of Patent Applications for Imatinib and Derivatives, EUR. PATENT 
OFFICE: ESPACENET, https://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails 
/inpadocPatentFamily?CC=US&NR=5521184A&KC=A&FT=D&ND=3&date=
19960528&DB=worldwide.espacenet.com&locale=en_EP (last visited Nov. 10, 
2017). 
 16 Information on European Patent No. WO9903854 (A1), EUR. PATENT 
OFFICE: ESPACENET, https://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/ 
biblio?CC=WO&NR=9903854&KC=&FT=E&locale=en_EP (last visited Nov. 
10, 2017). 
 17 See Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Kapczynski, supra note 13, at 1577. 
 20 Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at paras. 13–14 (India). 
 21 Under four of these five orders, the commissioner determined that the 
invention Novartis was claiming had been anticipated by prior publication, that it 
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the most important of these orders, the IPO determined that Gleevec, 
a modified salt form of imatinib, did not pass muster under Section 
3(d) of the Patents Act, which spells out criteria for “What are not 
Inventions.”22 Novartis appealed to India’s newly formed 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and filed two new 
petitions with the Madras Supreme Court—one challenging the 
constitutionality of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act and another its 
TRIPs-compliance.23 The court dismissed both petitions in 2007.24 
Notably, in the process, the IPAB reversed the IPO’s declaration 
that the salt version of imatinib had been anticipated in earlier patent 
filings outside of India; it also reversed the declaration that the 
modified drug failed to qualify as a non-obvious invention.25 
However, the IPAB endorsed the IPO’s decision that Novartis failed 
to clear Section 3(d)’s “requirement of higher standard of inventive 
step [sic]” and its more stringent standards for what counted as 
“patentable in India.”26 Thus, the IPAB backed the Madras High 
Court’s view upholding the constitutionality of Section 3(d) and its 
underlying aim of “prevent[ing] evergreening” and “provid[ing] 
easy access to the citizens of the country to life saving drugs.”27 
Novartis next leapfrogged to the High Court, bringing a 
subsequent challenge directly to India’s Supreme Court in 2011.28 
After more than two years of proceedings, with much fanfare and 
                                               
was obvious to a person skilled in the art in light of previously published patents, 
that the priority date of July 18, 1997, had been wrongly claimed for the patent 
application in India, and, therefore, that the alleged invention had also been 
anticipated by the specification made in the Swiss application. Id. at para. 14. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. at para. 15. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. at para. 17. 
 26 Id. at para. 17 (quotations omitted). Since the Novartis decision, India has 
pressed its defense of the Supreme Court’s view of the notion of inventive step to 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For its considered 
submission, see STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., STUDY ON INVENTIVE STEP, SCP/22/3 (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_22/scp_22_3.pdf. 
 27 Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 18. 
 28 Novartis took advantage of Article 136 of the Indian Constitution to seek a 
Special Leave Petition, arguing that any patent’s expiry was soon approaching in 
2018. Id. at para. 21. 
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controversy, in 2013 the Court denied Novartis a product patent on 
Gleevec one last time. Although the decision was lengthy and 
complex, it turned on the implications of what the Court called the 
“redefin[ition of] the concepts of invention and patentability” in 
Section 3 of the amended Patents Act.29 
In addressing Section 3(d), the Court concluded that the salt 
version of imatinib was not an “invention” under the Patents Act of 
1970.30 It then went on to consider whether the salt qualified as an 
invention in its own right. Here, while the Court accepted that the 
salt could be counted as “new,” it did not further consider whether 
it qualified as an “inventive step,”31 deeming the issue moot because 
Gleevec “directly runs into section 3(d)” of the Patents Act.32 The 
Court further elaborated that under Section 3(d), “inventions” must 
enhance “the known efficacy” of a substance.33 Rather, for a drug 
like Gleevec, the very “function, utility, or . . . purpose” of which 
was to act as a medicinal therapy, “efficacy” could only mean 
therapeutic efficacy.34 Accordingly, mere physico-chemical 
                                               
 29 Id. at para. 24. Under the subtitle “What are not Inventions,” after the 2005 
amendment, the section reads as follows: “The following are not inventions within 
the meaning of this Act, —(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known 
substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
substance or the mere discovery of any new property . . . .” The Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, § 3(d), No. 15, Acts of Parliament (India). 
 30 Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 131 (“[W]e are completely unable 
to see how Imatinib Mesylate can be said to be a new product, having come into 
being through an ‘invention’ that has a feature that involves technical advance 
over the existing knowledge and that would make the invention not obvious to a 
person skilled in the art. Imatinib Mesylate is all there is . . . . It is a known 
substance from the [previous] patent.”). 
 31 Id. at para. 158. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at para. 180. 
 34 The Court determined that the “test of efficacy in the context of section 3(d) 
would” not be the traditional dictionary definition of efficacy. As it further 
explained, “in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of 
efficacy can only be ‘therapeutic efficacy’ . . . judged strictly and narrowly.” Id.  
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properties like “more beneficial flow” or “increased bioavailability” 
were held to not be efficacy enhancing under Section 3(d).35 
With this ruling, the Court endorsed the more robust standard of 
patentability for modifications to existing compounds that the 
Patents Act mandated after being amended to comply with TRIPS.36 
At the same time, its stance was intentionally equivocal. The Court 
thus highlighted not one, but two ways that Section 3(d) could be 
read to heighten the bar for protection: first, as a provision “setting 
up the standards of ‘patentability,’” and second, by “exten[ding] the 
definition of ‘invention.’”37 
The pharmaceutical industry immediately accused India of 
showing a general hostility to IPR, the TRIPS, and fair play by 
requiring a “second tier” criterion for pharmaceuticals to qualify as 
patentable.38 Not surprisingly, then, the case was, and is, hardly 
limited to its import to India alone. Since 2010 it has become the tip 
of a larger iceberg of cases where developing countries are 
challenging strict patent rights of drugs for non-communicable 
conditions like cancer and cardiovascular disease, which is further 
discussed in Part V. 
While the Gleevec case is an example of developing countries 
setting up higher standards of patentability, other mechanisms—like 
compulsory licensing—have figured prominently in forming the 
proverbial iceberg as well.39 As documented in Part VI, and as 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below, the Gleevec case is hardly an 
isolated phenomenon. Is it, however, simply a coincidence that these 
all involve drugs for NCDs rather than for infectious diseases? In 
the remainder of this Article, I argue that it is not. 
Rather, there is a fundamental shift afoot in the debate on access 
to medicines and patents due to a new form of strategic action that 
                                               
 35 Id. at paras. 187–89. On the issue of bioavailability, the Court held that 
bioavailability had to be “specifically claimed and established by research data.” 
Id. at para. 189. 
 36 Amy Kapczynski, Engineered in India-Patent Law 2.0, 369 NEW ENGL. J. 
MED 497, 497–98 (2013). 
 37 Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 at para. 190. 
 38 Interestingly, the Court peremptorily addressed this very accusation at length. 
See id. at paras. 103–04. 
 39 See infra Part VI. 
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developing countries are now undertaking. In trying to comprehend 
this shift, however, we must first step back from the specificities of 
individual cases and controversies. In doing so, we will be able to 
broaden our perspective in two key ways. First, we will see how the 
traditional drugs-for-the-developing world debate first materialized 
and how it became emblematic of the supposedly zero-sum tradeoff 
between access and incentivization. Second, we will see why the 
shifting facts of the public health crisis in the developing world 
demand law and policy makers to re-theorize the relationship 
between the norms of access and incentivization in precisely the way 
developing countries have been asking by breaking with strict IPR 
for NCD drugs. 
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Table 1: Recent Challenges to NCD-drug Patents based on 
Heightening Bar for Patentability40 
 
                                               
     40 For discussion of the information in Table 1 and Table 2, see infra Part VI. 
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Table 2: Recent Challenges to Strict NCD-drug patents based on 
Compulsory Licensing  
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III. STAGING THE ACCESS-INCENTIVIZATION DILEMMA: THE 
LINKED HISTORIES OF FREE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE 
DRUGS-FOR-THE-DEVELOPING WORLD DEBATE 
Before discussing the developing world’s NCD crisis, Part III 
begins by summarizing how the drugs-for-the-developing world 
debate co-evolved with the rebuilding of the legal framework during 
the post-Cold War economic liberalization. As the reader will see, 
the linking of these histories has been crucial in making the 
theoretical tension between pharmaceutical access and 
incentivization appear intractable. 
This narrative must begin with the founding of the WTO in 
1994, amidst euphoria over a new world order (rhetorically) 
premised on harmony and globalization. However, this euphoria 
began to dampen within the WTO’s first decades of existence as 
“politics” quickly began taking over “economics” as the governing 
factor in world affairs after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001. Early difficulties were clearly evident by 2004 with the 
stymying of efforts to extend the spirit of multilateralism to the 
liberalization of new areas like investment and financial services.41 
Negotiations through the WTO process itself were also beset by 
conflict, especially over agricultural subsidies. 
Since 1994, the modern world has only once moved towards 
more circumscribed regional/bilateral agreements as a second-best 
alternative for advancing liberalization.42 Between this first retreat 
from a more ambitious agenda of multilateral globalization and our 
now impending reversion to the same tendency in the wake of 
                                               
 41 E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1868 U.N.T.S. 186. 
 42 See Mohammed El-Said, The Road from TRIPS-Minus, to TRIPS, to TRIPS-
Plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD INT. PROP. 53 (2005); 
Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: the Chile-USA Free 
Trade Agreement, TRIPS-ISSUES PAPERS 4 (2004), http://law-wss-
01.law.fsu.edu/gpc2007/materials/roffe_ottowa2004.pdf; David Vivas-Eugui, 
Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), TRIPS-ISSUES PAPERS 1 (2003), 
http://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/3610-regional.pdf. 
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populist upsurge of 2016,43 the pendulum has swung back in the 
other direction. By 2011, at the same time that talks for the now-
defunct TPP were intensifying, parallel efforts to resume global 
integration on a multilateral basis were taking place through other 
treaties including the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, and the 
Trade in Services Agreement.44 Additionally, bilateral treaties with 
major economic powers like Korea and China were also either 
approved or actively pursued in the last five years.45 
Given the oscillations between multilateralism and bilateralism 
within our ongoing era of post-Cold War globalization, it is easy to 
forget that we are still only a generation removed from the 
controversy the WTO ignited around IPRs and access to medicines. 
Before 1994, while many developing countries allowed process 
patents, TRIPS-compliance required WTO member states to allow 
for product patents as well (and, as with process patents, in any field 
of technology including pharmaceuticals).46 Concerns about the 
impact of IPRs—and specifically, patents—on public health in the 
developing world thus achieved broad social penetrance only after 
the Uruguay round of negotiations of the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trades (resulting in the WTO). Moreover, it was only two 
years later in 1996 that the first truly effective anti-retroviral 
                                               
 43 While the future is unclear, the Trump administration and conservatives in 
Britain appear to be moving toward bi- or scaled-down multi-lateralism. See, e.g., 
Alan Wolff, Free Trade Is Not Dead Under Donald Trump, FORTUNE (Dec. 15, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/15/free-trade-donald-trump-tpp. 
 44 See Robert E. Lutz, Linking Trade, Intellectual Property and Investment in 
the Globalizing Economy: The Interrelated Roles of FTAs, IP and the United 
States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION 155–70 (Christopher Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015); Peter 
K. Yu, Déjà Vu in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 113–29 (Matthew David & Debora 
Halbert eds., 2014). 
 45 While the idea of a trans-Atlantic free trade area goes back to the 1990s, the 
idea was revived by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2007 and pursued in 
earnest only after 2011. See James Kanter & Jack Ewing, A Running Start for a 
U.S.-Europe Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/business/global/obama-pledges-trade-pact-
talks-with-eu.html. 
 46 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 27.1. 
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therapies for HIV/AIDS became available.47 As many recall, a 
turning point was reached in 1999 when global health activists 
targeted then Presidential-hopeful Vice President Al Gore for 
silence over the pharmaceutical lobby’s efforts to limit South Africa 
in making the AIDS/HIV “triple cocktail” available to its citizens.48 
Subsequently, the drive toward upward harmonization of 
national IP regime design became more controversial as the deadline 
for developing countries to comply with TRIPS approached (in 
2005).49 The drugs-for-the-developing world controversy thus 
increasingly became TRIPS’ legacy, especially for civil society 
actors and the public.50 Already by 2001, at its Ministerial 
Conference in Qatar, the WTO was compelled to issue its famed 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which was meant to 
confirm the availability of various “exceptions” to strict IPRs.51 
While the Doha Declaration did partially quell concern, worries 
remained.52 Indeed, no sooner did member states endorse TRIPS-
flexibility in Qatar than the push for so-called TRIPS-plus 
protections started to appear.53 
By the late 2000s, the TRIPS-plus agenda was increasingly 
becoming a default position in ongoing negotiations for Trans-
Atlantic and Trans-Pacific integration. Therefore, at least one trend 
that has been evident since 2011 will likely survive a return to 
                                               
    47 Jintanat Ananworanich & Joep M.A. Lange, The Discovery and 
Development of Antiretroviral Agents, 19 ANTIVIRAL THERAPY (SUPPLEMENT 3) 
5, 6 (2014), https://www.intmedpress.com/serveFile.cfm?sUID=c47b3504-
6207-4956-a8d2-2e344a807db6. 
 48 Julian Borger, Gore Accused of Working Against Cheap Aids Drugs, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 1999, 20:47 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/1999/aug/10/uselections2000.usa. 
 49 The transition period, which has been extended for some countries, actually 
varied for different categories of developing countries. See TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 7, at arts. 65, 66. 
 50 DAVID HULME, GLOBAL POVERTY: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POOR 
PEOPLE IN THE POST-2015 ERA 188–89 (2d ed. 2015). 
 51 World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 52 See Charles T. Collins-Chase, The Case Against Trips-Plus Protection in 
Developing Countries Facing Aids Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763 (2008). 
 53 Id. 
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bilateral free trade under a Trump administration.54 Namely, this 
trend is the continued pursuit of a TRIPS-plus agenda will occur side 
by side with a period in which conflict over drug patents in the 
developing world has become more acute than at any time since the 
Doha Declaration. Indeed, even though countries like India and 
Thailand never fully lost their place on the United States Trade 
Representative’s (USTR) Priority Watch List for allegedly creating 
barriers to trade, criticism of their IPR policy reached new heights 
in the last five to six years.55 
It is only against this larger backdrop that we can understand 
how popular and scholarly discussion has come to portray the 
relationship between patents and public health as intractable.56 
Indeed, part of the reason behind this assumption is that the 
normative dilemma imposed by the supposedly imminent tradeoff 
between pharmaceutical access and incentivization has always been 
three-fold. First, there is the normative demand of the new legal 
regime enshrined in the TRIPS agreement. As a result, we ask not 
about whether strict IPR/upward harmonization should be the norm 
so much as how far countries should be allowed to move away from 
the TRIPS rule through exceptions/flexibilities. Second, there is the 
normative demand of neoclassical economic theory. As a result, we 
tend to ask less about whether patents incentivize innovation than 
we do about how far economic theory, as if speaking in one voice, 
should be our only guide. It is only in a third and final sense that the 
demand to decide how we should tradeoff long-term economic 
                                               
 54 If the impending talks about the fate of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) are any guide, this may have already started to be borne out. 
See, e.g., Nicholas Caivano & Richard Elliott, Warning – A New NAFTA Could 
Prevent Vital Medicines Getting to Millions Worldwide, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Aug. 
19, 2017, 8:00 AM EDT), http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/caivano-
and-elliott-warning-a-new-nafta-could-prevent-vital-medicines-getting-to-
millions-worldwide. 
 55 The Priority Watch List is part of the “Special 301 Report” the USTR issues 
annually. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Special 301: Its Requirements, 
Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259 (1989); see also 
Sean M. Flynn, Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Global Access to 
Medicines, 7 J. GENERIC MED. 309 (2010). 
 56 See, e.g., George Wehrfritz, Thailand’s New Drug War, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 8, 
2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/thailands-new-drug-war-97635. 
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rationality and immediate-term ethics—in a world where avoiding 
harm means avoiding infectious diseases—becomes normative 
dilemma’s most visible face. 
In the face of this seeming intractability at the heart of our 
existing drugs-for-the-developing world debate, it seems that 
opposition to the upward harmonization of national IP regime 
design is not only growing but also increasingly fragile.57 Indeed, 
ever since the founding of the WTO, the burden of proof has always 
been firmly on those demanding less strict approaches to patents 
rather than vice versa. The first-ever amendment to TRIPS, created 
in January 2017, is telling in this regard. While it waives the 
requirement that licenses issued to create generic versions of on-
brand drugs should be restricted to a country’s own local market, it 
simultaneously confirms how TRIPS’ “flexibility” has not only been 
uncertain and largely unused for more than sixteen years but also 
how its future use is likely to remain tightly restricted.58 
Therefore, our overall existing drugs-for-the-developing world 
debate has produced a double-edged sword. Advocating for access 
to “essential medicines” through the exceptionality of TRIPS-
flexibilities has clearly been crucial. At the same time, some argue 
that the access-incentivization dilemma is so acute that departing 
from strict IPR would be an inevitable health crisis.  
IV. “DISEASES OF CIVILIZATION” GO GLOBAL: THE 
BURGEONING CRISIS OF NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASE IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 
Falling under the heading of NCDs are conditions such as 
cancer, arteriosclerosis and other cardiovascular ailments, mental 
illness, asthma and other chronic respiratory diseases, and a host of 
other afflictions including type 2 diabetes, cirrhosis, and chronic 
renal failure. Using data from 2008, in its first (and most recent) 
global action plan on such conditions, the World Health 
                                               
 57 See Ellen Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents, and 
Access to Medicines for All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 1 (2011). 
 58 World Trade Org., WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access 
to Affordable Medicines, WTO.ORG (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm. 
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Organization (WHO) estimates that out of the 56 million annual 
global deaths that occurred in 2008, some thirty-six million—or 
nearly 63%—were due to NCDs.59 
Traditionally seen as burdens on the health of developed country 
populations alone, NCDs have been called both “diseases of 
civilization” and “lifestyle” ailments. Accordingly, they are 
generally linked to the patterns of diet, work, and leisure that 
characterize the relatively more prosperous societies of the Global 
North.  
A. NCD-Related Health Loss in the Developing World 
Such an impression, however, is mistaken—as the just-cited 
figures from the WHO’s Global Action Plan on NCDs make clear 
when broken down according to the location in which deaths 
occurred .60 Already by 2008 only 20%—or seven million—of the 
thirty-six million NCD-related deaths that year occurred in high-
income countries, a group the WHO defines to include North 
America outside of Mexico, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and a handful of 
other countries.61 As Figure 1 shows, the other 80% of global NCD-
related deaths in 2008—making for a total of twenty-nine out of the 
thirty-six million total—took place in low and middle-income 
countries.62 
                                               
 59 World Health Org., Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases: 2013–2020 (adopted 2013) [hereinafter WHO, 
Global Action Plan]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 The WHO’s full list includes the Bahamas, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, and Brunei Darussalam. World Health Org., Global Burden of Disease: 
2004 Update (2008) [hereinafter Global Burden of Disease]. According to the 
World Bank’s Atlas method, high-income countries have a gross national income 
per capita above $12,476 (measured from 2015). There are currently seventy-nine 
such countries. World Bank Country and Lending Groups, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
 62 These two categories comprise the remainder of the world’s countries for the 
WHO. In 2015 terms, its thirty-one current “low-income” countries have gross 
national incomes per capita of $1,025 or less (and includes places like 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Nepal, and Uganda); its fifty-two lower-
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Longitudinal data provides more compelling evidence of NCD 
burden on the developing world. By 1990, only 40% of the total 
number of worldwide NCD-related deaths occurred in low and 
middle-income countries, but by 2008, the proportion doubled to 
80%.63 Furthermore, future projections estimate that by 2030 low 






In addition to suffering from an increasing proportion of total 
global deaths, developing countries’ inhabitants will also die of 
                                               
middle-income countries have gross national incomes per capita of $1,026 to 
$4,035 (and includes places like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Honduras, India, 
Morocco, Uzbekistan, and Zambia); its fifty-six current upper-middle-income 
countries have gross national incomes per capita of $4,036 to $12,475 (and 
includes places like Albania, Argentina, Ecuador, Lebanon, and Thailand). Id. 
 63 WHO Mortality Database, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2017), 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/. 
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NCD deaths at an earlier age.65 For example, in 2008, NCD-related 
deaths accounted for 48% and 26% of deaths for persons under age 





Looking beyond actual deaths, a similar story is borne out by 
assessing the impact of NCDs through the more nuanced metric of 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). Developed in the early 
1990s by the World Bank and researchers at Harvard University, the 
DALY has increasingly been adopted as a standard67 because it is 
meant to capture the years of life lost due to premature deaths 
(YLLs), as well as the years of life lost due to disability or poor 
                                               
 65 D.E. BLOOM ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM & HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES (2011) 
[hereinafter HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden]. 
 66 Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: Premature NCD Deaths, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/gho/ncd/mortality_morbidity/ncd_premature_text/en/ (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
 67 See ALAN D. LOPEZ ET AL., GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE AND RISK FACTORS 
3–4 (2006); Christopher Murray, Quantifying the Burden of Disease: The 
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health (YLDs).68 Equivalent to one lost year of “healthy” life, the 
DALY thus represents a measure for quantifying the absolute health 
loss resulting from both mortality and morbidity. 
Based on the most current figures, as measured in DALYs, total 
annual health loss in 2010 reached 2.49 billion, 31% of which came 
from YLDs and the remaining 69% from YLLs.69 During the last 
two decades, there has also been a marked overall decline—of 
23%—in health loss per 1000 persons, from 472 DALYs in 1990 to 
361 in 2010,70 as well as a sizeable increase in the percentage 
composition of DALYs comprised by YLDs over YLLs.71 
More important are the changes between 1990 and 2010 to the 
respective contributions that NCDs have made to cumulative global 
health loss. As Figure 3 shows, DALYs from NCDs have increased 
in the developing world over the last twenty years (from 36% to 
49%) but remained unchanged (at 83%) in the developed world 
during the same time period.72 This was almost entirely due to the 
increasing share of lost DALYs from NCDs in the developing 
world.73 
                                               
 68 YLL’s are calculated by multiplying the number of deaths from a given 
disease and a standard life expectancy for the age at which death occurs. YLD’s 
are calculated by multiplying the number of incident cases in a given period, the 
average duration in years of the disease case (until remission or death), and a 
“disability weight,” a factor reflecting disease severity on a scale from 0, 
representing perfect health, to 1, representing the state of being dead. LOPEZ ET 
AL., supra note 67. Since its 2010 Global Burden of Disease study, the WHO has 
modified this formula, with the YLD now reflecting the product of the disability 
weight and the number of prevalent cases (rather than the product of incident cases 
and case duration). Health Statistics and Information Systems-Metrics: Disability-
Adjusted Life Year, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
 69 Christopher J.L. Murray et al., Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYS) for 
291 Diseases and Injuries in 21 Regions, 1990–2010: A Systematic Analysis for 
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, 380 THE LANCET 2197, 2210 (2012). 
 70 Id. at 2198, 2202. 
 71 Id. at 2213 (Figure 6). 
 72 Id. at 2198. 
 73 GBD (Global Burden of Disease) Compare, Data Visualization Tool, INST. 
OF HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION, http://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017). Of course, there remains a large degree of 
epidemiological variation. See Murray, supra note 69, at 2214. 




Of course, this is not to deny that there is some truth to the notion 
that NCDs are diseases of the rich. For example, relative to overall 
mortality burden within different country groups—whether 
measured in DALYs or actual deaths—NCDs are responsible for 
more of the total in high-income societies than in the low and 
middle-income ones.74 Likewise, within the developing world, it is 
those with higher income who are more likely to be afflicted by 
NCDs.75 However, both of these facts must be balanced against two 
others. First, as noted above, a greater absolute number and a more 
rapidly increasing share of total deaths due to NCDs are now taking 
place within the developing world. (These sources of disparity, 
moreover, will remain constant or increase in the future given the 
higher rate of population growth in developing countries.) Second, 
                                               
 74 Global Burden of Disease, supra note 61, at 11. 
 75 HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 11. The 
correlation is not fixed. In low and middle-income countries, the poorest can also 
become the more seriously afflicted by NCDs. See Marc Suhrcke et al., CHRONIC 
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within the low and middle-income country groups, less-affluent 
inhabitants are more likely to die once afflicted by any given NCD.76 
B. NCD-Related Economic Loss in the Developing World 
As is the case for the burdensome effect of disease in general, 
there can be little doubt of a close connection between health and 
economic loss due to NCDs. The most obvious example of this 
phenomenon is seen in the growing role of YLDs over YLLs in the 
global composition of DALYs lost due to NCDs.77 In the developing 
world in particular, the close connection between health and 
economic loss due to NCDs is evidenced by the large and growing 
share of the mortality burden shouldered by individuals of 
reproductive78 or otherwise still working age.79 In an important 2005 
study of the top 23 contributors to NCD-related health loss in the 
developing world (that were responsible for some 80% of the 
developing world’s total), it was projected that in the period from 
2006 to 2015 the cost of lost national income from diabetes, stroke, 
and heart disease alone would reach $84 billion.80 
More recent attempts at examining economic loss have proven 
even more eye-opening. They have also proved increasingly 
sophisticated in terms of methodology, generally distinguishing lost 
output and value of statistical life approaches for tabulating 
economic loss from so-called “cost of illness” approaches.81 The best 
                                               
 76 HSPH-WEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 11. 
 77 Murray, supra note 69, at 2213. 
 78 Id. at 2215. The reproductive age group generally ranges from ages 15–49. 
Id. at 2211. 
 79 Suhrcke, supra note 75, at 11 (estimating that 80% of chronic NCD-DALY’s 
in low and middle-income countries are 60 years old or younger). 
 80 Dele O. Abegunde et al., The Burden and Costs of Chronic Diseases in Low-
Income and Middle-Income Countries, 370 THE LANCET 1929, 1929 (2007). 
 81 Value of lost output approaches focus on how NCDs affect gross domestic 
product (GDP) through considering the role of disease in depleting a country’s 
factors of production, including labor and capital. HSPH-WEF, The Global 
Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 14. Cost of illness approaches look at both 
direct and indirect NCD costs and consider factors like personal medical expenses 
from diagnostic procedures, drugs, and inpatient/outpatient care; non-medical 
expenses like for transportation for treatment; non-personal costs of information, 
education, and research; and the loss of income. Id. The value of statistical life 
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of these studies—by the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) 
in conjunction with the World Economic Forum (WEF) —provides 
three separate projections for cumulative economic loss from NCDs 
for the twenty-year period from 2010 to 2030: lost output and value 
of statistical life (shown in Table 3) and cost of illness approach 
(shown in Figure 4). 
For lost output, the HSPH-WEF study finds that cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and 
mental illness will cost low and middle-income countries an 
enormous $21 trillion versus $25.5 trillion for high-income 
countries over the same period.82 
For the statistical life approach, the HSPH-WEF study tallies a 
figure of $23.8 trillion in projected economic loss for low and 
middle-income countries between 2010 and 2030 versus $20 trillion 
in loss for high-income countries for the same time period.83  
 
Table 3: Economic Loss from NCDs 2010 to 2030* 




Lost output $21 Trillion $25.5 Trillion 
Value of Statistical 
Life $23.8 Trillion $20 Trillion 
Annualized % 
Loss to World 
Nominal Product 
3.9% to 4.4% 2.1% to 2.7% 
*Sources: HSPH, WEF, World Bank 
 
On either approach, the HSPH-WEF study finds the average 
expected annual cost to low and middle-income countries to be more 
than $1 trillion (that is, $21 trillion or $23.8 trillion divided by 20 
                                               
approach reflects a given population’s willingness to pay for reducing the risks of 
NCD disability/death. Id. 
 82 Id. at 29 (calculating in US$ 2010). 
 83 Id. at 33. 
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years). This annualized amount can be compared to the World 
Bank’s latest data on low and middle-income countries’ contribution 
to the world nominal product for 2015 ($27 trillion out of $74 
trillion).84 Holding these figures constant for simplicity’s sake, low 
and middle-income countries would be expected to experience an 
average annual NCD-related economic loss of a striking 3.9% or 
4.4% of their total contribution to world nominal product in any 
given year up to 2030.85 This can be compared to the average annual 
loss to world nominal product of 2.1% or 2.7% that high-income 
countries would experience through 2030.86 Moreover, this does not 
account for the premium that should be placed on each dollar lost in 
the developing world relative to each lost in the developed world, 
given the relative poverty of the former as compared to the latter and 
what it means for the “marginal utility” of what is lost. 
While summarizing the HSPH-WEF findings based on a cost of 
illness approach is more difficult, the findings are largely in line 
with the overall trends indicated by two other measuring 
approaches. For example, the sum of the direct costs of diabetes in 
low and middle-income countries is expected to increase from a 
mere 9% to 75% from 2010 to 2030.87 A similar, though less 
dramatic, story is true for the indirect costs associated with diabetes, 
which would increase from 50% to 76% from 2010 to 2030.88 This 
is balanced against what is expected to be only a slight shift in the 
percentage of low and middle-income country inhabitants afflicted 
with diabetes, from 74% of the global total of 285 million people in 
                                               
 84 WORLD BANK, GDP Ranking (Feb. 1, 2017), http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/GDP-ranking-table. 
 85 Lost output measure = US$21 trillion/20 years (world nominal product); 
statistical life measure = US$23.8 trillion/20 years (world nominal product). Id. 
 86 Lost output measure = $US25.5 trillion/20 years (world nominal product); 
statistical life measure = $US20 trillion/20 years (world nominal product). Id. 
 87 Conversely, the high-income country share of diabetes’ direct costs incurred 
by high-income countries will drop from 91% of this total to only 25%. HSPH-
WEF, The Global Economic Burden, supra note 65, at 25. 
 88 Conversely, the high-income share of diabetes’ indirect costs will drop from 
50% to 24% of the total. Id. 
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*Total Direct Costs worldwide increased from $376 Billion to $486 Billion 
 *Total Indirect Costs worldwide increased from $96 Billion to $255 Billion 
 
While the cost of illness approach may provide less digestible 
aggregate headline figures, it is especially interesting because it 
reckons with both the direct and indirect costs of NCDs. Compared 
to other methods, it highlights that even though the drugs-for-the-
developing world debate has focused on curative (pharmaceutical) 
interventions, addressing public health crises also involves creating 
better strategies for prevention. Indeed, relatively low-cost and non-
drug based measures—like smoking cessation programs and 
cervical cancer screening—are particularly important for mitigating 
the burden of NCDs.90 Consider, for example, the many preventative 
                                               
 89 The corresponding high-income country share will fall from 26% of the 
global total (or 75 million people, as opposed to the developing world’s 210 
million) in 2010 to 21% (or 93 million people, as opposed to the developing 
world’s 345 million) in 2030. Id. 
 90 Shanthi Mendis et al., Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases 
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interventions in the developed world that are built on generic drugs, 
such as using aspirin as a means of preventing cardiovascular 
illness.91 Here, the lack of patent protection on the relevant 
therapeutic agent is hardly a starting point for discussion, much less 
anything that we would generally envision as an omen of some 
coming era devoid of medicines. In this respect, thinking about 
preventative intervention, in the same way that cost of illness 
accounting for NCD-related economic loss in the developing world 
encourages us to, is already a first step toward unfastening the 
straitjacket of the access-incentivization dilemma.  
C. The Importance of the High Price of NCD Drugs 
Notwithstanding the benefits of low-cost preventative 
intervention, there is no doubt that the high prices for NCD drugs 
are/will become a significant obstacle to better public health in the 
developing world like the high prices for communicable disease 
drugs have been.92 There are a number of reasons for this. First, 
curative versus preventative measures cannot always be firmly 
distinguished by the presence or absence of drugs as part of the 
intervention design. As determined in the communicable disease 
context by HIV/AIDS, there only needs to be a single or otherwise 
small number of ailments that require costly drugs for their 
prevention to make patent-inflated pricing a key issue in the success 
of preventative intervention overall.93 Therefore, the high prices that 
make it difficult even for developed world health agencies to 
increase the availability of preventative therapies, like human 
papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine, are guaranteed to be more 
                                               
 91 Id. at 63. 
 92 In India, for example, 50% to 80% of expenditure for medical treatment is on 
medicines. S. Srinivasan, ‘Medicines for All,’ The Pharma Industry and the Indian 
State, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. (June 11–17, 2011). 
 93 Of course, HIV/AIDS drugs, unlike drugs for conditions like malaria, are the 
one example among communicable disease medications that have robust markets 
in the developed world. In this respect, they foreshadow why easing the 
developing world’s access to NCD-drugs by moving away from strict approaches 
to patent rights would not pose any meaningful threat to the multinational 
pharmaceutical sector’s incentives. 
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significant for low and middle-income countries because they will 
not have access to them.94 
Second, there is the fact that the burden of NCDs is mounting in 
the developing world. As ailments like cancer and cardiovascular 
disease grow in prevalence, so too will the demand for generally 
higher priced drugs needed to treat them. Moreover, these drugs are 
generally more likely to retain their status as higher priced because 
it is these drugs that pharmaceutical firms have the strongest 
interests in protecting behind patent walls—at least, evidently, if the 
profits they profess to garner from consumer markets in high-
income countries are to be believed. 
Third, populations in the developed world are/will be living in 
the same age of declining R&D spending as those in the developing 
world. This is part and parcel of the increasing reliance by 
multinationals on lucrative “me-too” drugs that redirect funds 
toward marketing and advertising activities to differentiate such 
products from their largely equivalent competitors.95 (From the 
consumer standpoint, spending that remunerates marketing budgets 
may be no more than a form of economic waste insofar as it leads 
not to innovation but artificial product differentiation perpetuating 
inflated prices for their own sake.96) Moreover, this tendency is 
likely to prolong the period in which patents on NCD drugs—and 
the inflated prices they allow—persist. To the extent that there is 
increasing pressure to engage in so-called evergreening, the 
significance that high prices for NCD drugs have on hindering 
                                               
 94 E.g., H.V. Hogerzeil et al., Promotion of Access to Essential Medicines for 
Non-communicable Diseases: Practical Implications of the UN Political 
Declaration, 381 THE LANCET 680, 684 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
 95 Arguments have been made that me-too drugs reduce consumer prices 
through competition. For an effort to quantify the tradeoffs (reaching mixed 
conclusions at best), see Stephane Régnier, What is the Value of ‘Me-Too’ 
Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE MGMT. SCI. 300 (Feb. 26, 2013). 
 96 For a still useful overview of different positions, see Peter Doyle, Economic 
Aspects of Advertising: A Survey, 78 THE ECON. J. 570 (Sept. 1968). See also O.J. 
FIRESTONE, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ADVERTISING (11th ed. 2013). 
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public health in the developing world will become more, and not 
less, intense.97  
Finally, patent-inflated prices for NCD-drugs are/will become 
more important because they impose additional costs on health care 
systems that are rooted in the particular kind of innovation culture 
they encourage. For example, patents are ill-suited for capturing the 
social value created by preventative health interventions. This is 
because the non-pharmaceutical based “information goods” that 
such interventions either partly rely on or wholly consist of are 
highly “non-excludable” in nature, thus making it difficult to patent 
them.98 As a result, an innovation culture focused on patents will 
tend to crowd out precisely those goods comprising the non-drug 
based means of preventative intervention that are most likely to 
compel a shift away from patent reliant/price-inflated 
pharmaceutical goods in the first place. As suggested earlier, this is 
particularly important in relation to NCDs given how much more 
significant preventative intervention generally is in mitigating the 
morbidity and mortality they cause.  
V. THE ARGUMENT STRUCTURE OF NORMATIVE STALEMATE  
Ultimately, the high prices that are made possible by the 
monopolistic tendencies of patent protections on NCD drugs raise 
two considerations pertinent to the argumentative structure of our 
existing drugs-for-the-developing world debate. The first concern is 
how the gains to multinationals from patented compounds should be 
classified—whether as ordinary producer surpluses, excessive 
supracompetitive profits,99 or outright confiscatory economic 
                                               
 97 See Ralf Boscheck, Intellectual Property Rights and the Evergreening of 
Pharmaceuticals, 50 INTERECONOMICS 221 (July 2015). There is much 
dissatisfaction with the term “evergreening.” However, it should not be mistaken 
for clarity as to patent extension being of no importance. See Douglas L. Rogers, 
Double Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 
14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 317 (2017). 
 98 Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the 
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–16 (2013). 
 99 “Supracompetitive profits” are generally understood as profits that are set at 
a higher level than what could be obtained in a “normal” competitive market. For 
a discussion in the legal context, see, for example, Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. 
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rents.100 The second deals with the extent to which these gains 
needlessly come at the expense of consumer surpluses that 
developing world inhabitants could otherwise recover through more 
robust markets for generics and increasing competition.101 
By equating the problem of public health in the developing 
world with a crisis of infectious disease, these questions become 
easier to elide. For most of the period during which upward 
harmonization of national IP regime design has been the default in 
international economic law, lost consumer surplus has been either 
ignored or implicitly recast as a vanishing immediate-term cost. At 
best, the suggestion goes, such losses are outweighed in the long run 
by the benefits of financing the entry of new health-enhancing 
compounds onto the market. On this view, patent power is finite, 
and the near-term relationship between (confiscatory) producer and 
(confiscated) consumer surpluses will reverse in time. Once the 
patent ends, competition is projected to make the latter increase and 
the former decrease, especially as the volume of total sales expands 
as lower prices bring market expansion.102 However, as I argue 
further below, such generalities provide even less guidance in the 
NCD context than they have in the communicable disease context 
                                               
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
 100 See Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, 
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 
67, 118 (2005) (explaining that pharmaceutical rents “come at a great cost to 
society”); see also Anup Mialani, Reverse Settlements, Part 2: Drug Company 
Profits, BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 26, 2013), https://blogs.harvard.edu/ 
billofhealth/2013/01/26/reverse-settlements-part-2-drug-company-profits/ (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2017) (describing that the amount spent by companies on R&D 
correlates with the total expected rents from the patents they may obtain). 
 101 Outterson, supra note 100, at 72. 
 102 For further reading on this theory, see Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on 
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93 (2004). See also How 
Patents Encourage Innovation in Technological Development and Deployment, 
GLOB. GCS INST., https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/intellectual-
property-rights-role-patents-renewable-energy-technology-innovation/1-how-
patents-encourage-innovation-technological-development-and-deployment; 
PhRMA Statement on Patent Reform Act of 2009, PHRMA (Mar. 3, 2009), 
http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-patent-reform-act-of-
2009. 
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as to how long we should tolerate the tradeoff,103 which is the crux 
of the matter.104 Judged by this most crucial issue, measures making 
IPR regimes stricter—as through standardizing twenty years as the 
minimum period for protection105—seem arbitrary.  
It is worth noting that focusing the artificiality of the normative 
stalemate that the infectious disease perspective creates does not 
eliminate the tension between access and incentivization. There are 
obviously more traditional paths of normative argument—whether 
on the grounds of ethics or neoclassical economic theory—that can 
and have been made against strict approaches to patent rights.106 At 
the same time, if this Part does not simply reproduce arguments 
against a patent-based innovation system, it is for reasons other than 
just avoiding reinventing existing wheels. It is thus crucial for 
academics and policy makers to consider new exit strategies from 
the long-standing circle of traditional pro- and con- positions on 
                                               
 103 E.g., Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent 
Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials (Nat’l Bureau 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19430, 2013); Angus C. Chu, The Welfare 
Cost of One-Size-Fits-All Patent Protection, 35 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 
876 (2011). 
 104 The question of “optimal” patent length defies generalization across 
industries. Even in any given category the best approach to determining optimality 
is elusive. See C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent, 38 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 839 (1956); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A 
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840 (1990); Andrew W. Horowitz & Edwin L.C. Lai, Patent 
Length and the Rate of Innovation, 37 INT’L ECON. REV. 785 (1996); Meir Perez 
Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
NEW HORIZONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29–31 (2004). 
 105 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 33. 
 106 The most prominent figure to do so is Nobel Prize-winning economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693 (2008); see also, e.g., Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. 
Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing 
Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75 (1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting 
Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 20 HEALTH AFF. 119 (2001); 
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer, & Jerry Avorn, Extensions of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on 
Medicaid Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1637 (2006); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID 
K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (1st ed. 2008). 
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drug patents and public health. For doing so will not only help us 
make sense of the new pattern of conflict in developing countries 
around drug patents, but it will also help prevent the increasing level 
of debate about drug prices in the developed world from, itself, 
counterproductively becoming trapped in the same circle.  
A. Normative Arguments For and Against Patent Rights 
As conventionally understood, the rationales for patent rights are 
two-fold. One broad category of theories emphasizes the role of 
intellectual property as a means for rewarding creativity (taking into 
account both the labor and investment to create) that is considered 
as a good inherently worthy of reward.107 While ostensibly free-
standing, such views are difficult to separate from the second broad 
category of consequentialist justifications for patent rights that focus 
on the need to reward creativity (and the labor and investment going 
into it) in order to encourage technological innovation108 and, 
thereby, the proliferation of the wider social good it engenders.109 
Insofar as the latter class of consequentialist bases for a strict 
approach to patent regime design is more specifically welfarist in 
nature,110 the idea of the proliferating social good to which the 
incentivization of creativity is linked further permits justification to 
be articulated through the idiom of conventional economic theory. 
From the microeconomic standpoint, this entails emphasizing the 
                                               
 107 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17–18 (1st ed. 
2011). 
 108 This is the case either if creativity is understood to be inherently reward 
worthy on “Kantian” lines (which tend to blur the deontological bases of property 
rights with a consequentialist one) or if deontology and consequentialism are, 
themselves, understood to be indistinct. For the equivocal nature of Kant’s moral 
theory, see DAVID CUMMISKEY, KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM (1996). On the 
inherent equivocality of the deontology/consequentialism distinction—albeit, in 
the context, of specifically “utilitarian” versions of consequentialism, and “rule” 
versus “act” versions of utilitarianism, see Gerald F. Gaus, What is Deontology? 
Part One: Orthodox Views, 35 J. VALUE INQUIRY 27, 28–29 (2001). 
 109 For a more typical example of blurring these two bases of justification, see 
Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law 
and Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011). 
 110 Of course, not all consequentialism is welfarist. See William W. Fisher & 
Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing 
World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 637 n.135, 638 n.140 (2006–2007). 
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possibility of a net welfare gain from erecting legal barriers to entry 
into a market by a firm’s competitors. On this view, there is a long-
term culture of innovation that can be expected to follow from 
assuring inventors an increased income that would otherwise be 
stymied by the free ridership of non-innovators on the ingenuity of 
others.111 The overall benefit of mitigating the risks of R&D through 
patents is thus seen to outweigh the short-term cost (in lost consumer 
surplus) that may result from granting their holders exclusive 
rights.112 In the context of international economic relations, much of 
the same reasoning is typically used to argue for the upward 
harmonization of country-level IPR standards, even despite the 
tendency for strict patent regimes to concentrate innovation in the 
developing world. The implicit assumption, in other words, is that 
longer-term economic welfare effects will eventually trickle down 
to the residents of the developing world.113 
From the macroeconomic perspective, patent rights acquire a 
further significance when explaining economic growth. In this 
regard, patents are often thought to be significant because they help 
to sustain positive marginal returns to capital that create the 
additional positive spillovers (especially in a knowledge-based 
economy by furthering innovation, technology’s learning-by-doing 
effects, and so on) necessary for growth, according to some 
economists.114 This is because, unlike in the first wave of 
neoclassical growth theories of the kind pioneered by Robert 
Solow,115 in so-called endogenous growth theory, technological 
                                               
 111 RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 179–81 (2013); Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 108–09 (1990). 
 112 See NORDHAUS, supra note 104. 
 113 FRANK MÜLLER-LANGER, GABLER, CREATING R&D INCENTIVES FOR 
MEDICINES FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 99–100 (2009). 
 114 Bart Verspagen, Intellectual Property Rights in the World Economy, in 
ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 489–518 (Ove Granstrand ed., 
2003). 
 115 Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, THE Q. J. 
OF ECON. 65, 70 (1956); Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957). For a recent 
restatement, see DARON ACEMOGLU, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 56–
69 (2008). 
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change is seen as more than just haphazard or accidental.116 Instead, 
endogenous growth theorists envision technological change 
(including the type that one can argue is incentivized by patent 
rights) through investment in research and development to be part 
and parcel of economizing behavior itself as firms seek to overcome 
the effects of otherwise diminishing returns on their capital. 
Accordingly, insofar as a strong patent rights regime can be said to 
help facilitate technological change through driving R&D 
investment, it becomes a prerequisite to growth in its own right.117 
While the above synopsis summarizes the main points of 
conventional economic theory’s reformulation of the 
consequentialist basis for patent rights, it is not exhaustive. Besides 
the possibility that deadweight losses from the monopolistic 
tendencies118 in pricing will be outweighed by the boon of a culture 
of innovation, others sometimes quote lesser economic reasons 
favoring strict patent rights. Especially in the pharmaceutical 
context, the effects of forcing information disclosure through the 
patent filing process can also produce benefits that redound to the 
economy more generally.119 Some see the positive spillovers of 
technological innovation as necessary prerequisites to growth, while 
others emphasize that patents rationalize the process by which 
sequential innovations accumulate. Through setting the bargaining 
positions under which cooperation between first innovators and 
                                               
 116 For the canonical early formation, see Paul Romer, Endogenous 
Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. 71 (1990). For a broader discussion of 
subsequent contributions by Romer and others, see GEORGE KORRES, TECHNICAL 
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INSIDE THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 
41–50 (2d ed. 2008). 
 117 Verspagen, supra note 114, at 492–93. 
 118 For a (purportedly) skeptical view about patents-as-outright monopolies, see 
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000). 
 119 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong 
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 
278–79 (1998); see also STAFF OF COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., STUDY 
OF THE S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS (Comm. Print 
1985). 
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those seeking to harness the positive externalities of their work 
proceeds, patents are thus said to promote additional efficiencies.120 
It is not easy to square such potential advantages with the evident 
failure of the patent system in the context of infectious diseases. If 
it was, then the drugs-for-the-developing world controversy would 
not have gained as much attention.121 Indeed, as William Fisher and 
Talha Syed note, the most apparent marks of this failure correspond 
less to a tradeoff between access and incentivization, and more to a 
failure to deliver either.122 
First, some of the most effective existing therapies for treating 
infectious diseases are insulated by patent protection. This allows 
patent holders to price these therapies at a cost that the world’s poor 
are not able to afford. Second, the new therapies that are greatly 
needed for treating these same infectious diseases are few and far 
between. As discussed earlier, firms are more focused on creating 
drugs that are functionally similar to lucrative equivalents already 
on the market or instead focused on creating new drugs for treating 
diseases that are most prevalent in high-income countries that 
generate more revenue.123 Therefore, with regard to drugs for 
neglected diseases in low and middle-income countries, the market 
has proven incapable. There is no coordinating a proper overlap 
between the willingness (due to the underlying inability) of the 
afflicted to pay for existing therapies and the prices at which drug 
makers are allowed to set their willingness to accept payment. In 
turn, the market has been incapable of generating new therapies for 
infectious diseases that are already undersupplied. 
We can further restate both halves of this two-sided failure for 
treating infectious diseases in terms of conventional economic 
theory. In the language of information economics, the failure to 
broaden access to communicable disease drugs corresponds to what 
Stiglitz calls the “static inefficiency” that IPRs create.124 Strict patent 
                                               
 120 Suzanne Schotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991). 
 121 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 8, 48, and 57. 
    122 Fisher & Syed, supra note 110, at 583. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Stiglitz, supra note 106. 
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rights exclude end users or competitors from capturing the 
additional utility value that their increased consumption of 
(medicinal) goods would otherwise make possible. This is because 
the main input to such goods is knowledge, the use of which carries 
no marginal cost. If consumers were permitted to consume more 
knowledge-based goods, or, if competitors to the patent holder were 
able to consume more knowledge for production, then more welfare 
would materialize. Accordingly, with knowledge-based goods, there 
is no a priori reason to think increasing output will lead to rising 
costs and increases in consumer prices. Indeed, there also is ample 
reason to think they would actually decrease due to more robust 
competition and market expansion.125 
The apparent failure of IPR-inflated pricing to deliver 
innovation in the infectious disease drug context corresponds to 
what Stiglitz calls the problem of the “dynamic costs.”126 Even under 
the best-case scenario, as Stiglitz emphasizes, where patents do 
reward (and thus encourage) innovation, there is a fundamental 
disparity between marginal private and social returns. That is, the 
marginal social return from patents (when they do actually 
encourage innovation) lies in how they bring about innovation 
earlier than it otherwise would have materialized. Due to the scale 
and complexity of the research, especially for producing high 
technology goods, the innovation usually results from multiple 
research groups converging on the same breakthrough. The regular 
course of events, in other words, is clearly not the occurrence of 
some act of singular genius making the breakthrough. 
Innovation instead usually takes place within, or based on, 
underlying foundational research, made possible by public funding 
or the public sector,127 and is a matter of when and not if. However, 
patent-based innovation systems reward whoever gets there first in 
a way that fails to proportionally account for the benefit that newer 
                                               
 125 Id. at 1700. 
 126 The “dynamic costs” making for a negative of patents in Stiglitz’s eyes 
should be distinguished from his allusions to “dynamic incentives”—that is, 
incentivization—as a justification for patents. Compare id. at 1704, with id. at 
1706. 
 127 See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: 
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013). 
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versions of the innovation will confer on society. That is, the patent 
system does not reward innovators based on the increment of social 
return resulting from innovation being brought to market earlier than 
it otherwise would have been; rather, it rewards the recipient of the 
right with a windfall gain comprising the entire value of the 
innovation.128 Even if the pharmaceutical sector was providing a 
steady supply of new infectious disease drugs, patent protections on 
such hypothetical innovations would involve dynamic inefficiencies 
that could easily outweigh their apparent benefits. 
B. The Failure of the Market versus Market Failure 
The existing innovation system has demonstrated a notable 
inability to facilitate either the emergence of new communicable 
disease drugs or a widening of the availability of existing ones in the 
developing world. As a result, this would seem to give us good 
reason to hesitate before transposing the abstract dichotomy 
between access and incentivization (and the theoretical dilemma it 
portends) onto the NCD context. Mitigating against such hesitance, 
however, is the way that a failure to deliver either communicable 
disease drug access or incentivization can be detached from the 
problem of market failure—and certainly so as to deemphasize IPRs 
as its cause. “Market failure,” in the technical sense, is the 
consequence of several underlying problems, such as imperfect 
information, preference structures that are mismatched in time, 
externalities, non-competitive markets, and public goods. Market 
failure is not a product of a failure to create equitable or otherwise 
ethically desirable results, but only of ones that fail to be “efficient” 
(whether on the more exacting standard of Pareto efficiency or some 
less exacting one like the Kaldor-Hicks variety).129 
As suggested earlier, the misalignment between consumers and 
producers of communicable disease drugs does result from a non-
competitive market and one that is substantially dictated by patents. 
The infectious disease drug market is thus characterized by goods 
                                               
 128 Stiglitz, supra note 106, at 1706–07. 
 129 For a brief summary of these oft-discussed concepts, see Ken Cooper-
Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, Economic Analysis Substantive Inequality and Tort 
Law, in TORT THEORY 137 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds., 
1993). 
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with sale prices that do not correspond to their marginal cost of 
production. However, within the existing drugs-for-the-developing 
world debate, the implicit tendency has been to stop well short of 
casting such market imperfection as the cause of market failure. 
Instead, it becomes the consequence of rationally balancing one 
source of potential market failure with another that is particularly 
liable to affect pharmaceuticals as knowledge-based public goods. 
Accordingly, a familiar train of suggestions ensues. Because 
there is no marginal cost associated with their key input of 
knowledge, public goods such as pharmaceuticals ordinarily would 
result in the greatest efficiency by being distributed for one and all 
to use freely.130 However, this fails to account for the need to use 
past discoveries to generate new knowledge. As a result, the 
corrosive effects of free ridership are seen as a much greater concern 
for pharmaceuticals than for other knowledge-based public goods 
(which have actual or ostensible zero-marginal costs of use). Rather 
than two failed goals of the patent system (in the communicable 
disease drug context), access and incentivization instead end up as 
two poles of a seemingly imminent and zero-sum tradeoff. 
Paradoxically, the concept of market failure ends up adding to 
rather than taking away from the case for strict IP regime design. 
This is especially so when we consider that law and policy concepts 
are deployed not only in specialist literature, but also more 
importantly as part of ordinary language sound bites in the public 
sphere. In terms of its rhetorical structure, the existing drugs-for-
the-developing world debate has meant no sooner is the question of 
market failure raised than it is made to recede. In its place, the key 
question instead becomes one stated in terms of how we should trade 
off aims that are ostensibly different in kind: whether of the short- 
versus long-term, the “ethical” versus the “economic,” or, in 
cannibalizing Stiglitz’s critique of strong IPR, the “static 
inefficiencies” of patents versus their “dynamic incentives.”131 
                                               
 130 Stiglitz, supra note 106, at 1700. 
 131 See generally Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New 
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002); James Huebner, Moral 
Psychology and the Intuition that Pharmaceutical Companies Have a ‘Special’ 
Obligation to Society, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 501 (2014); Sara Parker-Lue, Michael 
216 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 175 
Even when the existing infectious disease drug market is 
imagined to reinstate the supposedly acute normative dilemma 
between access and incentivization, all of the same objections 
remain that lean against strong IPR. It is thus not clear that drug 
patents have been successful in promoting innovation, despite the 
fact that pharmaceuticals are often said to be one of the best 
examples of strong IPR at work.132 Additionally, what innovation 
does occur in drug development is financed largely through public 
funding, especially for the foundational research on which the 
products of privatized end-stage invention are parasitic.133 Then 
there also remains the issue of how the revenues that are generated 
by allowing producers to sell patented compounds above their 
marginal costs are actually used. As noted earlier, rather than for the 
purposes of financing R&D, these funds are now routinely and 
increasingly apportioned to ever-expanding budgets that firms 
devote to marketing and advertising.134 
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Regardless of these objections, in the absence of any a priori 
way of definitively calculating how to make the relevant tradeoff, 
the familiar metaphor of balancing implies that the difficulty of the 
choice lies in sacrificing present “do-gooding” for a more sober-
minded view of the future. On this view, a strict IP regime becomes 
the lesser of two evils because it ultimately preserves the ongoing 
existence of the market and the progress it is purported to have made 
possible in the first place. Paradoxically, the more extreme the 
failure of the market in ensuring pharmaceutical access and 
incentivization in the infectious disease drug context is, the less 
strictly is the approach to patents because of the problem of market 
failure, in the technical sense of economic theory. On the contrary, 
the more extreme the market’s failure has been, the more 
government interference with private rights has been seen as the real 
problem. Ultimately, strict approaches to patent rights and the 
upward harmonization of national IP regime design becomes 
presumptuously market-strengthening, notwithstanding the way it 
openly undermines competitive market structures. 
By assuming that the developing world is plagued by 
communicable disease alone, an inverse proportionality is created 
between the perceived relevance of the technical problem of market 
failure and that of the market’s practical failure to elicit either 
pharmaceutical access or incentivization. Indeed, the very existence 
of this inverse proportionality further heightens the sense that the 
real problem is forgoing “ethics” for “economics.” In other words, 
once the upward harmonization of national IP regime design is seen 
to result from a necessary tradeoff between accepting imperfection 
in the competitive structure of the market in the present and avoiding 
greater market disruption due to the problem of public goods in the 
future, the economics of market failure is even more clearly 
absolved of relevance. In turn, the purported fact that the majority 
of the developing world’s inhabitants are simply outside the market 
creates greater concern. This is because these inhabitants are viewed 
less as consumers whose demand the market has failed to equilibrate 
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with the corresponding supply than they are as a class of needy or 
(potentially) afflicted. Therefore, the dichotomy between economics 
and ethics ends up being entrenched. Increasing pharmaceutical 
access depends, at best, only on a stance rooted in a morality of 
deontic empathy or utilitarian prudence—and not any justifiable 
compunction born from economics’ higher rationality. 
Needless to say, there are many problems with distinctly 
separating the economic dimension from the ethical dimension of 
strict approaches to patents and the upward harmonization of 
national IPR regime design. First and foremost, it reifies the 
market.135 To categorically distinguish the two thus ends up 
naturalizing one highly contingent way in which to arrange certain 
aspects of the market’s institutional design; namely, that which 
follows from strict approaches to IPR. Whether seen as necessary or 
counterproductive—by their supporters and detractors, 
respectively—alternative institutional arrangements appear as if 
they can follow only from imposing outside logics onto the design 
of the rule regime that economics would otherwise clearly mandate. 
To dichotomize the logics that factor into questions about national 
IP regime design also then exacerbates the tendency for the drugs-
for-the-developing world debate to become a proxy for the larger 
debate on free trade to which it need not be related at all. For that 
debate, too, has been rhetorically premised on a categorical 
distinction between the “economic” and the “ethical” issues raised 
by globalization. In turn, departures from strict IPR frameworks of 
the kind that have been pushed through free trade agreements in the 
post-Cold War come to be reflexively delegitimized as examples of 
protectionist antipathy to a true ethos of market freedom.  
C. Re-Contextualizing the Access-Incentivization Dilemma in Light 
of the Crisis/Economics of NCDs 
The circumstances that bring together those who produce drugs 
for infectious diseases and those who need these drugs have thus 
been made to seem extremely fragile. On the one hand, there is a 
market within which consumers are so devoid of purchasing power 
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that they make, in effect, for no market at all. With such individuals 
becoming more so a collection of the needy than any aggregate 
source of demand, their predicament attenuates any sense that the 
real problem is one of market failure. On the other hand, there is no 
significant class of persons afflicted by “third world” ailments in 
rich countries. Consequently, even notwithstanding the obvious and 
often severe economic stratifications within high-income countries, 
low and middle-income countries are the only market for such drugs. 
In the end, it becomes more implausible to regard the developing 
world as a realm in which companies should be expected to function 
out of the goodness of their hearts. 
As different as these two circumstances may appear on the 
surface, however, underneath they evoke a surprisingly resilient 
figure of the multinational pharmaceutical firm. This is because the 
multinational is portrayed as being squeezed on all sides. On one 
side, it is threatened by the public’s perception that the firms profit 
off of the sick and dying bodies of the poor. On the other side, it 
faces the hard facts that there is little reason to manufacture—let 
alone research and develop alternatives for—the types of drugs 
needed for those in low and middle-income countries. The portrait 
of the pharmaceutical industry as a victim besieged on all sides 
effectively suggests that the prices for infectious disease drugs, 
absent patents, would have to be entirely non-remunerative. In turn, 
any denial of the firm’s ability to avail itself of patent protections 
ends up becoming the real interference with the market, and also one 
that is both insensible and unfair. 
The sophisticated observer may well know that there are more 
specific empirical considerations upon which the veracity of these 
suggestions—leading back to an intractable access-incentivization 
dilemma—actually depends. Yet in the public sphere, the recurrent 
starting point for the drugs-for-the-developing world debate is the 
multinational pharmaceutical firm, which is seen as the inheritor of 
an impossible role. On the one hand, the firm is seen as being left to 
stand watch over the economic incentives necessary to make drug 
development possible. On the other, it is then scorned for ethical 
villainy. Not surprisingly, we consequently often hear about the 
widely quoted, but much less interrogated, price tag of $800 
million—or, since the latest update, now $2.6 billion—that the 
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development of a single new compound is purported to cost.136 Even 
within economically fluent legal literature, there is a substantial 
tendency to start from the same kinds of observation—this is partly 
because of the highly porous boundary between specialist 
scholarship and the discourse of the public sphere. 
Against such a backdrop, it is unsurprising that the means for 
making essential medicines for infectious diseases more readily 
available in the developing world are typically framed as exceptions 
to a default of strict patent rights. Such potential exceptions include 
mandatory licensing agreements; segmented markets through tiered 
pricing; lower retail prices through parallel importation; 
government-declared national and public health emergency as a 
basis for licensing; so-called true equity pricing; and more robust 
competition through assorted ways of building up the generic drug 
industries.137 
Often discussed in the WTO context as so-called TRIPS-
flexibilities, these measures have not all been equally accepted, 
much less operationalized. Even so, characterizing them as 
exceptions from a norm of strict IPR rather than paths to a different 
norm altogether has always been due to the constraints of political 
reality as much as logical necessity. For example, the need for 
national emergency licenses is bound to seem exceptional only if it 
is imaginatively surrounded by the assumption of an ostensibly non-
context dependent zero-sum tradeoff, demanding that we prioritize 
hypothetical incentivization over access. Yet once we begin to 
reckon with the normative aims of access and incentivization from 
the standpoint of the developing world’s NCD crisis, national 
emergency licensing just as well may exemplify the arbitrary nature 
of treating upward harmonization of national IP regime design as 
the preferred norm. This is because unlike with communicable 
diseases, the global burden of which are concentrated in areas with 
the economically least remunerative markets, NCDs and the cost-
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amortizing supracompetitive profits they provide from developed 
world markets are distributed more evenly across all country groups. 
If the crucial importance of this fact has not been at the forefront 
of academic and policy debate in the developed world, there is little 
doubt about its becoming so in the developing world. Indeed, the 
new pattern of conflict over drug patents and the TRIPS that has 
emerged since 2010testifies to that. As the global share of NCD 
burden absorbed by developing countries increases, controversies 
over patents will increasingly call the theoretical good sense of 
upward harmonization/strict IPR itself into question. This is a matter 
the article returns to in the new pattern of conflict it documents 
between developing countries and multinational pharmaceutical 
firms in Part VI. 
Even if the marketization of low and middle-income country 
demand for NCD drugs becomes constrained in the future, existing 
levels of cost-amortizing supracompetitive profits should remain 
intact. It is important to remember that current returns are evidently 
more than sufficient to sustain the high levels of profitability the 
multinational pharmaceutical sector reports.138 Nor is there any 
reason to expect that firms will suddenly siphon existing returns in 
order to escalate the subsidy they provide to R&D for new infectious 
disease drugs. 
To say only this much is to misstate the present state of affairs. 
Rather than remaining at a standstill, multinationals will commodify 
at least part of the growing number of developing world inhabitants 
who will be afflicted with “rich country” diseases in the years to 
come. Dominant firms will thus be positioned to capture a new and 
distinct source of expanding profits as the well-off in the developing 
world increasingly consume not only more animal protein and 
automobiles, but also more therapies for the illnesses that such 
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lifestyles bring. Even supposing that firms reap no additional profits 
from such novel revenue sources, there is still no reason to expect 
any drastic worsening in the highly lucrative status quo that the 
multinational pharmaceutical sector presently enjoys. If anything, it 
is only reasonable to expect the opposite given that the NCD crisis 
will expand and bring new market opportunities not only in the 
developing world but also in the developed world itself. 
What if the multinational pharmaceutical sector ends up facing 
the even more unlikely eventuality of having to sell NCD drugs to 
developing world consumers only at marginal cost? There is still 
little reason to expect any deterioration of the existing situation of 
windfall profits—assuming that high-income country markets 
remained quarantined from arbitrage opportunities.139 Suffice to say, 
the industry would hardly fail to mobilize its political power at home 
to maintain (and expand) legal restrictions that already largely 
disbar intermediaries from importing developing country versions 
of drugs back into their home markets.140 Indeed, even if this extreme 
unlikelihood came to fruition, it would lead to a deterioration in the 
industry’s bottom line only if arbitrage pushed the original 
supplier’s ability to sell in the home market down to the same 
minimum. However, this defies both logic and existing reality. 
Ultimately, a future in which being forced to sell only at marginal 
cost in the developing world leads to the pharmaceutical sector’s 
current levels of high profitability deteriorating—or even staying the 
same—rather than expanding with the growing global NCD crisis is 
highly unlikely. 
The various qualifications outlined above are especially worth 
noting as we turn to the most careful of existing attempts to reckon 
with the access-incentivization dilemma in light of the developing 
world’s emerging NCD crisis. In his article on the topic, Keith 
Outterson distinguishes “neglected diseases” of the kind most 
readily associated with health crisis in low and middle-income 
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countries from what he calls “global diseases.”141 Because global 
diseases affect rich and poor-country inhabitants alike, but the poor 
disproportionately, Outterson advocates that these conditions should 
be addressed through a system of what he calls “patent buy-outs.”142 
Under such a system, only inhabitants of high-income countries 
would bear the cost of pharmaceutical patent rents.143 All patented 
drugs would then be offered to the other 84% of the world’s 
population at generic prices.144 This, Outterson argues, would create 
widespread public health gains by making medicines for all diseases 
more affordable in the developing world. At the same time, it would 
bring only a very slight decrease in global research and development 
cost recovery: as he notes, the more than 80% of patent-based cash 
flow undergirding such spending that now comes from sales within 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries would remain untouched.145 Indeed, it is in order to make 
up for even this slight deficit in the funds available for R&D 
spending that Outterson proposes the mechanism of patent buy-outs 
in the first place.146 Accordingly, its explicit purpose is to “[restore] 
to the companies” lost revenues from the inability to sell above 
marginal cost in developing world markets.147 
Outterson’s thoughtful proposal is notable for a number of 
reasons. Most of all, he is one of the few who have sought to address 
the drugs-for-the-developing world debate on a comprehensive 
basis by asking how to address both communicable and non-
communicable diseases. At the same time, the proposal is notable 
because it is premised on the assumption that even a minimal 
departure from the status quo guaranteeing high profits to 
                                               
 141 Keith Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low- 
and Middle-Income Countries, 32 AMER J.L. & MED. 159, 161 (2006) (“Global 
diseases are conditions which affect both rich and poor countries, but 
disproportionately affect the poor.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 160. 
 144 Id. at 171 (indicating that Outterson means marginal cost pricing). 
 145 Id.; see also Outterson, supra note 139, at 248. 
 146 Outterson, supra note 141, at 160. 
 147 Id. Given the difficulty of knowing the true costs pharmaceutical firms bear, 
Outterson runs through various scenarios about how his buy-out price might be 
calculated. Id. at 173. 
224 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 19: 175 
pharmaceutical multinationals would be unacceptable. This is 
implicit in the very idea of a buy-out mechanism that seeks to restore 
existing rents rather than some other negative, zero, or otherwise 
more constrained positive value above the margin. 
In this respect, one might say that what the proposal purports to 
give with one hand in terms of practical feasibility for addressing 
the ill effects of the patent system it takes away with the other. For 
it would still leave intact the normative stalemate that has emerged 
from the past two decades of debate based on the implicit context of 
a developing world plagued by non-remunerative “third world” 
diseases alone. Indeed, we can further illuminate this point by 
considering the practical complications that would surely await any 
patent buy-out mechanism of Outterson’s kind. 
Chief among these is the dual complication of (1) over-including 
developing world elites—who would otherwise be able to pay full 
prices—within the system of generic cost provisioning and (2) 
under-including those in the developed world who could not.148 For 
his own part, Outterson does acknowledge that over-inclusion —
especially of the millions who purportedly rank among the middle 
classes in places like China, India, and Brazil—would be 
particularly likely to attract opposition. However, the proposal 
underplays this admission by too hastily imagining that the 
inclusivity problem would find its own solution.149 Thus, on the one 
hand, Outterson suggests that under-inclusion could fix itself 
directly, given the very purpose of the buy-out mechanism.150 That 
is, the mechanism would naturally require larger transfers to 
pharmaceutical firms as the magnitude of lost rents increased. On 
the other hand, he suggests that under-inclusion might instead fix 
itself indirectly. In this case, the problem would prompt 
pharmaceutical companies to more vociferously pursue tiered 
pricing in developing country markets through brand campaigns and 
new restrictions on arbitrage.151 
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Believing in the likelihood of such self-executing solutions, 
however, portrays an attitude that is too sanguine about the ease with 
which under-inclusion would abate. Even a buy-out mechanism 
designed to keep the magnitude of existing returns to the 
multinational pharmaceutical sector untouched would thus hardly be 
any more practically feasible than whatever other solutions we 
might imagine. There are at least five more specific reasons why this 
is so. 
The first concerns the mechanism leading to the indirect fix for 
under-inclusion. For that mechanism could just as easily undermine 
the efficacy of the buy-out system overall. Building momentum for 
market segmentation to enable higher price tiers that could more 
easily make up for lost rents thus seems to be at sharp odds with 
fostering a market ethos receptive to making generics available at 
marginal cost. Likewise, insofar as the same momentum would lead 
to more intensive restrictions on arbitrage, its logic would again 
work against facilitating a culture of availability at marginal cost. 
Second, it is unclear why firms would accept recovery of lost 
rents from the elite stratum of developing world inhabitants alone. 
A highly contentious round of bargaining seems just as likely, and 
it is easy to imagine that it would aim for a costlier system based on 
a gradation of proportional buy-outs for what firms would argue 
were foregone revenues from additional down-market segments of 
developing world consumers. Given the visibility of their middle 
classes, Brazil, India, and China would become major flashpoints 
and possibly derail the whole buy-out system. This is especially 
because the proposal already assumes that special arrangements 
would be needed for these same countries to foot the bill for the buy-
outs directly from their own national budgets. If we cannot 
practically expect the United States, European Union, or the United 
Nations to finance buying out lost rents from these countries, why 
should we imagine that the pharmaceutical sector would be content 
losing more rather than less of those rents?152 Of course, this is 
assuming that getting countries like Brazil, India, and China to buy 
out even just the equivalent of rents from their middle classes would 
be possible in the first place. 
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Third, and even more troubling, the sizes of the developing 
world’s middle classes are difficult to estimate with certainty. This 
is compounded by the fact that, at least in conventional discussion, 
those classes are assumed to be rapidly increasing. If this was so, the 
multinational pharmaceutical sector would have even (more) reason 
to support a buy-out system of any kind. After all, the alternative 
would be a status quo in which firms could continue extracting at 
least their current rents from developing world markets directly. 
Especially with an expanding pool of such rents to anticipate, is a 
buy-out system really a more feasible solution than moving away 
from a norm of strict patent rights altogether? 
Fourth, and related, is the following question: if support for a 
buy-out mechanism (to incentivize ongoing R&D) is less likely than 
the proposal makes it seem, and if the patent system is as detrimental 
to access as the proposal assumes, what confidence can we have in 
the political reality it is built upon? This fourth problem is closely 
related to the fifth and last problem.  
This last problem is, namely, that it seems that actual events in 
the developing world are already reconstituting the sense of what is 
politically feasible. In this respect, the horizon of possibility seems 
to be moving in a very different direction from that which the patent 
buy-out mechanism assumes, as developing countries shift toward 
strategically contesting patents for NCD drugs. This pattern of 
conflict obviously cannot be completely divorced from the long 
history of controversy around various infectious disease drugs going 
back to the late 1990s.153 However, even as it builds on what came 
before, there is clearly a departure.  
 
VI. BREAKING WITH STRICT PATENT RIGHTS ON NCD DRUGS  
As the Gleevec controversy in India suggested, well before the 
current rise of skepticism about free trade liberalization, there has 
emerged a renewed push for questioning strict IPR in the developing 
world. This push back against strict IPR, however, has come largely 
from civil society, heterodox economics, health equity, and 
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responsible government perspectives rather than from party politics. 
In both theory and fact, it thus adds to the reasons why the crisis of 
NCDs is becoming the key issue that should encourage 
policymakers to assess the rules governing our global innovation 
system moving forward. 
While in the last half-decade developing countries have used 
many strategies to contest patents on NCDs—and, by extension, the 
architecture of TRIPS-based IPR regime design—it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to describe them all. Instead, in this section, an 
illustrative approach to two main types of contest is discussed. 
Continuing the discussion of the Novartis decision in India, the first 
involves further examples of developing countries that are 
effectively heightening the bar for patentability in the face of 
modifications to existing compounds.154 The second involves 
contests over NCD drugs rooted in the crucial mechanism for 
breaking with strict patent rights known as compulsory licensing.155 
A. Measures Heightening the Bar for Patentability (of 
Modifications) 
1. India and Tykerb 
Soon after the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in the Gleevec 
case, India’s IPAB revoked the patent on another prominent cancer 
drug known as lapatinib ditosylate. Sold by GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) under the name Tykerb, the drug is another tyrosine kinase 
inhibitor.156 It was initially approved for use in the U.S. in 2007.157 
In June 2008, the Kolkata office of the Controller of Patents 
issued GSK two patents, one for lapatinib and one for its ditosylate 
salt.158 Five years later, shortly after the Gleevec case was resolved, 
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in 2013 the IPAB issued two distinct decisions on the Tykerb 
controversy. Lapatinib itself was deemed non-obvious and thus a 
true qualifying invention protected from competition until 2019.159 
However, the IPAB revoked the patent for the salt form of the drug 
on two grounds. First, it held that GSK failed to meet the statutory 
requirement for non-obviousness under the Patents Act. Second, it 
found that GSK’s application fell afoul of Section 3(d).160 With the 
Novartis decision still fresh, the Section 3(d) rejection was solely 
because  the IPAB revoked GSK’s patent. As the IPAB declared, it 
“need not examine any further” claims made by the petitioner, but 
would address the “obviousness . . . issue since . . . [it was] 
important.”161 With the Tykerb controversy, it is not by accident that 
the Novartis decision’s approach to defining Section 3(d)’s 
heightened standard of patentability for modifications was cemented 
in the context of another prominent NCD drug.162 
2. India and Abraxane 
 The third prominent recent case involving a heightened bar 
of patentability for NCD therapies in India involved another cancer 
drug named paclitaxel, a mitotic inhibitor. Paclitaxel was approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the early 1990s to 
treat breast and ovarian cancers.163 Over the years, it has grown to 
include treatment for lung and pancreatic cancer as well.164 
Paclitaxel was originally commercialized by Bristol-Myers 
Squibb under the brand name Taxol.165 Subsequently, the 
biotechnology company Abraxis BioScience (later acquired by 
Celgene), modified the drug by binding it to the protein albumin.166 
This allows the drug to be administered intravenously in injectable 
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form. The albumin-bound modified version was called Abraxane, 
and Abraxis Bioscience filed for a patent on it in India in 2005.167 In 
2009, India’s Patent Office heard a motion for pre-grant opposition 
from the generics manufacturer Natco Pharma, claiming that 
Abraxane lacked an inventive step.168 Concurring with Natco’s 
assertions, the IPO’s Assistant Controller rejected Abraxis 
BioScience’s application on Section 3(d) grounds.169 In so doing, it 
cited the applicant’s inability to show that the albumin-bound form 
of paclitaxel had enhanced efficacy, understood to mean therapeutic 
efficacy as outlined in the Novartis decision.170 On appeal to the 
IPAB, the original decision was remanded back to the IPO to be 
considered anew.171 At the same time, Natco issued updated claims 
in opposition.172 In June 2014, the Indian Patent Office rejected 
Abraxane’s patent application once more.173  
3. India and Januvia 
We now turn to a controversy surrounding diabetic drugs in 
India. While still not fully settled, a major battle has been ongoing 
over Merck’s Januvia, a widely-used type-2 diabetes medicine. 
Januvia is the phosphate salt form of sitagliptin, a compound that 
increases insulin levels in the body, thereby lowering blood 
glucose.174 Januvia was approved in the U.S. by the FDA in 2006, 
and by 2007, modified preparations appeared on the market, most 
notably Janumet.175 In creating Janumet, Merck combined Januvia 
with another diabetic drug called metformin, which was already a 
generic drug in the U.S.176 This combination provided patients with 
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one pill (Janumet) containing two diabetes drugs (Januvia as the 
modified salt form of sitagliptin and metformin).177 
Merck had originally secured patents on sitagliptin in India in 
2007.178 However, after applying for new protections for Januvia 
(the modified phosphate salt form of sitagliptin), the IPO rejected 
granting Merck additional rights upon hearing a motion for pre-
grant opposition brought by the Indian company Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals.179 
After the IPO’s ruling in April of 2013, Glenmark then released 
generic versions of both Januvia and Janumet under the names Zita 
and Zitamet, respectively.180 Merck immediately filed suit in the 
Delhi High Court, requesting an interim injunction to restrain 
Glenmark from infringing on its patents.181 In defense of its actions, 
Glenmark argued that it was not infringing on Merck’s original 
sitagliptin patent.182 Rather, Glenmark argued that Zita and Zitamet 
were generic versions of the distinct but unpatented entity 
comprised of sitagliptin’s phosphate salt (Januvia and Janumet).183 
Glenmark thus claimed that there was no protected entity that Zita 
or Zitamet could be infringing upon.184 In response, Merck argued 
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that its phosphate salt was not an entity distinct from sitagliptin.185 
Merck even went so far as to use Section 3(d) of the Patents Act to 
claim the phosphate salt form of sitagliptin was nothing more than a 
derivative.186 
The Delhi High Court ultimately denied Merck’s request for an 
interim injunction, largely endorsing Glenmark’s reasoning.187 
However, on appeal in March 2015, the decision was reversed.188 
While the ultimate outcome of the Januvia controversy waits to be 
determined,189 the proceedings to date illustrate that conflict over 
Section 3(d) is not limited to cancer drugs. For example, a similar 
controversy is currently raging between various Indian generics 
companies and Novartis over Vildagliptin, another diabetic drug.190 
The Januvia conflict in India once more illustrates the way in 
which Section 3(d) has become entangled within its broader IP 
regime. It was thus Section 3(d) that became the IPO’s basis for 
denying Merck a patent on the phosphate salt of sitagliptin.191 
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Likewise, Glenmark additionally invoked Section 3(d) in justifying 
its choice to issue generic forms of Januvia and Janumet.192 Indeed, 
the provision was even cited by Merck to oppose Glenmark’s 
actions.193 
4. The Philippines and Lipitor (and Lyrica) 
The importance of the Indian Supreme Court’s Novartis decision 
has not been confined to India alone.194 Soon after its initial passage, 
Section 3(d) began to inspire other developing countries to institute 
similar provisions. In 2008, through the Universally Accessible 
Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act (R.A. 9502), the Philippines 
amended its eleven-year-old patent code, which was known as 
Republic Act No. 8293 (R.A. 8293),195 by inserting language very 
similar to Section 3(d) with two different amendments (Rule 8, 
Section 1 dealing with “Non-Patentable Inventions” and Rule 8, 
Section 2 dealing with “Inventive Step”196). 
With these amendments, the Philippines Congress codified the 
amended Indian Patents Act’s heightened bar for patentability as 
construed in the Novartis decision as part of its own IPR regime. 
Specifically, the amended Section 26.2 of Republic Act 8293 
elaborates new rules for a product to qualify as an invention;197 the 
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amended Section 22 also outlines more stringent criteria for 
patentability.198 Indeed, immediately after President Gloria Arroyo 
signed the amendments into law, controversy erupted in the country 
over Pfizer’s enormously important Lipitor.199 
The branded version of atorvastatin, Lipitor, is a lipid-lowering 
agent used to treat high cholesterol. The drug is a polymorph salt 
form of atorvastatin.200 By 2011, Lipitor was already history’s best-
selling drug.201 That same year, however, Pfizer’s U.S. patent was 
set to expire, with its Philippines patent to follow suit soon after in 
2012.202 As a modified salt form, the compound underlying Lipitor 
became a repeated source of conflict throughout the world—from 
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invention results from the mere discovery of a new form or new property 
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Australia, to South Korea, to India, and to the United Kingdom.203 In 
2009, the largest pharmaceutical maker in the Philippines, United 
Laboratories Inc. (Unilab), launched its own generic version of the 
drug.204 Arguing that the initial 1990 patent on atorvastatin had 
already expired, Unilab petitioned the Philippines Intellectual 
Property Office (IPO) to also cancel the patent on the salt form of 
the molecule in July 2009, claiming it was no more than a frivolous 
invention representing a minor modification that did not pass muster 
under the country’s amended patent code.205 By August 2009, Unilab 
was selling its own generic version of Lipitor under the name 
Avamax.206 In 2011, Pfizer attained a writ of preliminary injunction 
against Unilab.207 The next year, in a surprising turn of events, the 
same court that issued the earlier injunction reversed course, 
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claiming it had previously overlooked important legal and factual 
issues.208 
Given these events, it may not be surprising that Unilab soon 
after threatened to make another generic version of a different Pfizer 
blockbuster-drug, Lyrica.209 Known by its generic name, pregabalin, 
Lyrica is an anticonvulsant used to treat seizures and epilepsy, for 
which its maker sought secondary patents based on its use for 
treating chronic neuropathic pain.210 It was first approved for various 
uses in the U.S. and the E.U. in 2004 and was marketed the 
following year.211 
Pfizer’s squabbles over its Lyrica patents began in 2009 when 
several Indian companies sought marketing approvals from the FDA 
for generic versions of the drug.212 In response, Pfizer pursued legal 
action in U.S. courts, a strategy that culminated in a June 2014 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
prohibiting the appearance of generic competitors until 2018.213 
Although Pfizer’s victory at the D.C. Circuit came in the face of 
claims that the patent on pregabalin failed to describe any new 
invention,214 the legal situation in the Philippines has acquired a 
different significance, given the Section 3(d)-style language the 
country has enshrined in its own IP code.215 Indeed, from the outset 
of its public pronouncements threatening to make a generic version 
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of Lyrica available in the Philippines, Unilab was hewing closely to 
that language, claiming that Pfizer’s secondary patent was for a 
method of use, rather than any genuinely new invention resulting in 
an “enhancement of the known efficacy.”216 Therefore, even 
notwithstanding the conflicting outcomes of the ongoing legal 
battle, in the Philippines itself and in the U.S., the controversy will 
likely reverberate in the years to come. 
5. Argentina (and Beyond) 
Like the Philippines, Argentina has also moved to incorporate 
Section 3(d)-style provisions into its national IP regime.217 In May 
2012, the country’s Ministries of Industry and Health, together with 
its National Institute for Industrial Property (Argentina’s patent 
office), issued a joint regulation expanding the “Guidelines for 
Examination of Patentability of Patent Applications concerning 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions.”218 The new guidelines set 
out additional grounds for barring the patentability of a product, 
including several reasons relating to minor modifications to existing 
compounds.219 Polymorphs, like hydrates and solvates, enantiomers, 
active metabolites, salts, and derivatives of known substances, are 
thus singled out as non-patentable.220 As Banerjee observes, the 
stricture both evokes and exceeds Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents 
Act since it is meant to deny patentability to such derivatives, even 
in the event that they can be demonstrated to result in enhanced 
efficacy, whether therapeutic or otherwise.221 
As the Argentinian example illustrates, concern over the NCD 
crisis in the developing world is clearly generating a resurgent 
questioning of strict approaches to patent rights—and along varied 
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avenues. Indeed, in Argentina, it is a norm countering the lowering 
of the bar for patentability that has been instantiated at the level of 
the ins and outs of patent examination more than in the provisions 
of the country’s IP code. Indeed, it is Argentina’s South American 
counterpart, Brazil, which best exemplifies this observation. Its 
“prior consent” mechanism222 thus requires all grants of patents for 
pharmaceutical products and processes to first be approved by the 
country’s National Sanitary Vigilance Agency (ANVISA).223 
Celebrated and attacked in equal measure as a policy intervention, 
prior consent has left ANVISA besieged on all sides, both 
domestically and internationally. Of course, using “policy space” for 
patent examination is neither new nor specific to NCDs, as Kenneth 
Shadlen points out.224 Nevertheless, there is little argument that 
Argentina’s new examination guidelines mirror and reflect the 
influence of India’s newly validated heightened bar for patentability 
under Section 3(d). 
Well beyond the Philippines and Argentina, we find a growing 
list of countries that have considered or are considering adopting 
Section 3(d) language, or effectively similar measures, to restrict the 
patentability of compounds on the grounds of insufficient 
modifications. Beyond those discussed above, these countries 
include: Thailand,225 South Africa,226 Brazil,227 Malaysia, Indonesia, 
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and China.228 Ultimately, in the years to come, conflicts over 
patentability in the context of NCD drugs are likely to only increase.  
B. Compulsory Licensing (of Cancer Drugs) 
Compulsory licensing allows a government or third party to 
reproduce patented products or processes without the consent of the 
patent owner.229 Because governments make such allowances in a 
variety of ways, compulsory licensing is a term that designates a 
class of scenarios, rather than a single policy form. With compulsory 
licensing, government authorization is either more or less explicit 
and thus results in numerous formal definitions. For example, to 
some, compulsory licenses are “involuntary contract[s] between a 
willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the 
state.”230 As economists Eric Bond and Kamal Saggi observe, other 
definitions emphasize the involuntary component and equate 
compulsory licensing with patent breaking.231  
Discussion of compulsory licensing has increased significantly 
with the formation of the WTO and the passage of its underlying 
Marrakesh and associated agreements. Article 31 of the TRIPS 
made the practice permissible from the inception of the WTO.232 
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However, its role as a potential policy mechanism became truly 
visible only as civil society actors and treatment access advocates 
sought to clarify its meaning.233 Compulsory licensing was featured 
prominently at the WTO’s 2001 Doha Ministerial meeting as one of 
the TRIPS-flexibilities under discussion.234 Indeed, it was the Doha 
Declaration’s demand for clarification on Article 31235 that started 
the process leading to the 2005 proposal to amend the TRIPS.236 
It should be noted that the intensity of efforts to confirm the 
TRIPS-compliance of compulsory licensing is disproportionately 
greater than the frequency of its use, especially by developing 
countries. If anything, the struggle to clarify what the TRIPS permits 
is as good of an indicator of opposition to compulsory licensing as 
it is of support.237 Accordingly, long after the Doha Declaration, 
developing countries do not have any easy paths toward actually 
licensing drugs. India, often painted as one of the worst abusers of 
the practice, received its first application for a compulsory license 
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in 2011. To date, that application for the drug Nexavar is the only 
compulsory license the country has ever issued in the post-TRIPS 
era.238 This can be compared with more than 1,000 pharmaceutical 
patent approvals the country granted from 2007 to 2010 alone.239  
Recent studies confirm this general observation. According to 
one analysis, since 1995, there have been only 24 “verified” 
episodes in which “a [compulsory license] was publicly entertained 
or announced by a WTO member state.”240 Of the 24 verified 
episodes, nearly half occurred between 2003 and 2005, during the 
small window that opened in the immediate aftermath of the Doha 
Declaration.241 Only 13 of the verified episodes resulted in the 
issuance of licenses that were actually compulsory; three others 
resulted in voluntary agreements to license in the wake of 
negotiations, and of the remaining eight, the majority lead to nothing 
more than a price discount.242 Furthermore, the total number of 
“potential,” rather than “verified,” episodes the researchers found 
summed to only 34.243 
What countries were involved in the 24 verified episodes? 
Thirteen cases concerned upper-middle income countries, and 
another three cases concerned high-income countries.244 Low-
income (including “least developed”) countries were almost entirely 
absent.245 Finally, the large majority of verified episodes involved 
licensing or price discounting of drugs for treating HIV/AIDS.246 Of 
course, HIV/AIDS is a unique ailment due to both its visibility and 
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the way it explicitly figured into the campaigns for treatment access 
that led to the Doha Declaration in the first place.247 
Thus, despite what many may assume, compulsory licensing by 
developing countries is rare and difficult. Nevertheless, each next 
potential case is easily a magnet for recrimination. Consequently, 
developing countries face a standing risk even when entertaining 
these licenses, let alone if they try to issue actual licenses. Indeed, 
when attempts have been made, powerful countries have been quick 
to communicate that their discontent may be made manifest through 
the WTO’s remediation system, a playing field that many suggest is 
not level.248  
These circumstances call for an evaluation of compulsory 
licensing from both a qualitative and a quantitative approach. Even 
though there are too few instances of such licensing to provide a 
strong statistical trend over time, individual examples still reveal 
important information about how battle lines have been drawn and 
redrawn.  
1. The Thai Prelude to Recent Events 
Recently, the international community marked an important 
moment in the compulsory licensing saga, making for a culmination 
of sorts in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This took place in 2007, 
when Thailand and Brazil sanctioned licenses for two on-patent 
HIV/AIDS drugs, Abbott/Abvie’s Kaletra and Merck’s Efavirenz, 
within less than six months of one another.249  
Concomitant with its Kaletra and Efavirenz decisions, Thailand led 
the way toward pushing the battle over compulsory licensing into 
the field of NCD therapies as well. In January of 2007, the country’s 
Health Ministry authorized a generic version of clopidogrel 
bisulfate, an anti-platelet medicine used to fight heart disease that is 
jointly marketed by Bristol-Myers Squibb and the French 
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multinational Sanofi-Aventis under the brand name Plavix.250 In 
2008, the Health Ministry then upped the ante by adding several 
anti-cancer medications to its list, including Gleevec, docetaxel, 
erlotinib, and femara.251 The Gleevec case resulted in a price 
discount, rather than a license,252 while the other three cases are 
ongoing.  
Not surprisingly, a vigorous pushback against Thailand set in. 
Opponents in the industry and the USTR alleged that the country 
failed to follow proper procedures by neglecting to negotiate with 
the patent holders first.253 For its part, Thailand contended that prior 
negotiation was only necessary in the case of licenses for 
commercial use under Section 51 of the country’s Patent Act.254 Its 
own Health Ministry, Thailand argued, was issuing licenses only for 
public use,255 which required notification from the Department of 
Disease Control alone.256 Notwithstanding Thailand’s defense of its 
action, the controversy still stifled the momentum of the Health 
Ministry’s actions. To date, none of the licenses for NCD drugs that 
the country made notifications for in the period from 2007 to 2008 
pursuant to Section 51—whether for Plavix or any of the three anti-
cancer medicines—have been fully executed. In fact, even for its 
two HIV/AIDS drugs, only the license for Efavirenz has been fully 
executed; the license for Kaletra has not been.257 
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Thailand’s attempt to push its battles into the NCD context is 
best regarded as a precursor to a more insistent effort to reorient 
compulsory licensing policies that has been afoot for more than five 
years. An example of a more urgent situation is India’s licensing of 
the cancer drug Nexavar in 2012. The Nexavar decision reopened 
not one, but two different conversations about compulsory licensing 
in the NCD crisis. One conversation broached the issue of licensing 
on the grounds of non-commercial use that has been at the heart of 
the efforts by Thailand. The other conversation broached licensing 
on the grounds of a so-called failure to work a patent locally.258 The 
latter conversation has been largely dormant since 2001, when the 
U.S. was forced to withdraw a WTO suit against Brazil for 
AIDS/HIV treatment that involved failure to work issues. With the 
Nexavar controversy pushing the question into the NCD context, 
however, matters changed considerably. 
2. India and Nexavar 
As for the controversies that have erupted in cases of patent 
denial, India has been at the center of those involving the 
compulsory licensing of NCD drugs as well. For much the same 
reason, India also demonstrates the vulnerability of any emerging 
consensus in favor of reframing the access-incentivization polarity 
around NCDs. 
As the controversy over Gleevec was unfolding, India found 
itself at the center of another storm involving the very first 
compulsory license the country approved on a patented 
product/process in the post-TRIPS era. As in the Gleevec case, the 
Nexavar case involved a prominent cancer drug, although the 
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German multinational Bayer held the rights.259 Known under its 
chemical name as sorafenib, Nexavar is another tyrosine kinase 
inhibitor used as a targeted therapy in the treatment of certain 
kidney, liver, and thyroid cancers.260 Sorafenib was developed by 
Bayer in conjunction with the San Francisco-based Onyx 
Pharmaceuticals and was approved for use by the FDA in 2005 and 
the E.U. in 2006.261 Nexavar is the tosylate salt version of 
sorafenib.262 
The origins of the Nexavar controversy date back to 2001 when 
Bayer applied for patent protection in India. It received protection 
in 2008.263 Cipla, a generics manufacturer, then requested approval 
to launch a generic version of the medicine, and Bayer’s initial 
attempt to squash Cipla’s request was denied by the Delhi High 
Court.264 An exorbitantly expensive drug, Nexavar was sold only in 
small quantities in 2009 and 2010.265 Once the drug initially became 
available, Cipla announced that it would actually launch its generic 
version under the name Soranib in February 2010.266 A month later, 
in March 2010, Bayer returned to the Delhi High Court and sued 
Cipla for patent infringement.267 In response, Cipla challenged the 
validity of Bayer’s patent and countersued for its revocation.268 The 
Cipla trial commenced before the Delhi High Court on March 23, 
2011.269 The entire case, however, was overtaken by other events, 
with Natco, another Indian generic manufacturer, filing a 
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compulsory licensing application on Nexavar only four months later 
in the summer of 2011.270 The Controller General of Patents, 
Designs & Trademarks approved Natco’s application six months 
later on March 9, 2012.271 
Key to both Natco’s application and the Controller General’s 
approval was the scarcity of sorafenib on the Indian market. The 
Controller General thus found that Bayer had made no effort to 
manufacture the drug locally or to import it.272 In light of its claim 
that Bayer had failed to “locally work” its patent in India under 
Section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act,273 Natco proposed that if it was 
granted a compulsory license it would make its generic version of 
sorafenib available for Rs.8,800/month (as compared to 
Rs.280,428/month for branded Nexavar and Rs.30,000/month for 
Cipla’s Soranib).274 While under the terms of the license Natco was 
required to pay a six percent royalty, Bayer still appealed the 
Controller General’s decision to the IPAB but was met with defeat 
on March 4, 2013.275 Although Bayer continued to press its 
challenge against the Natco license—both to the Bombay High 
Court276 and Indian Supreme Court277—it was unsuccessful. 
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Both the Controller General and the IPAB (partly) based their 
decisions against Bayer on Section 84(1)(b)278 of the Patents Act, 
finding the company failed to make sorafenib “available to the 
public at a reasonably affordable price.”279 More controversially, 
they also weighed in on the nature of India’s “local working” 
requirement under Section 84(1)(c).280 Indeed, from the very 
inception of the WTO, there was confusion about the status of such 
provisions under the TRIPS. Article 27.1’s seeming negation of 
local working requirements,281 for example, contradicts Article 31’s 
seeming allowance of them.282 It is no wonder that such 
contradictions soon reached the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), most importantly with the U.S. suit against Brazil in 2001.283 
That case revolved around a local working requirement Brazil had 
included in the new industrial property law it had enacted in order 
to bring itself into TRIPS-compliance.284 
Given its indeterminate outcome, the U.S.-Brazil case ushered 
in nearly fifteen years of uncertainty around local working 
requirements under the TRIPS agreement. Of course, as in many 
other areas of IP regime design, the states that had been most central 
to the WTO’s creation continued to construe local working through 
the lens of the TRIPS as a mechanism for eliminating 
“protectionism.”285 Any robust version of local working was thus 
portrayed as antithetical to the spirit of liberalization, a stance that 
stymied the emergence of any clear definition of what it meant to 
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“work” a patent.286 In the wake of the U.S.-Brazil case, therefore,  
confusion remained around whether local working requirements 
were among the TRIPS’ oft-proclaimed flexibilities.287 
Continuing on this long interim of indeterminacy, the Nexavar 
controversy in its own right should be seen as a landmark 
controversy, much like the Gleevec case. Centering on a cancer 
drug, it is a clear departure from the unresolved 2001 dispute 
between the U.S. and Brazil about local working in the context of 
AIDS/HIV treatments.288 Equally notable is that the Controller 
General and the IPAB in India addressed the local working issue in 
distinct ways. According to the Controller General, to work the 
patent in India required that Nexavar had to be domestically 
manufactured, especially given Bayer’s existing facilities and 
operations in the country.289 The Controller General thus rejected 
Bayer’s claim that its nominal imports of Nexavar into India met 
this requirement.290 In the Controller’s own words, local working 
means “manufactured to a reasonable extent in India.”291 
The IPAB, on the other hand, ruled out deciding a priori that 
working “totally excludes import, or that ‘working’ is synonymous 
to ‘import’ and that if there is no manufacture in India, then there is 
no working.”292 Instead, it held that a case-by-case approach to the 
meaning of the requirement was needed, with it ultimately being the 
patentee’s responsibility to “show why [the patented product] could 
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not be locally manufactured.”293 The IPAB was eager to note that 
like the Controller, it was of the “of the opinion that the word 
‘worked’ has a flexible meaning;” moreover, it would be insensible 
to allow the local working requirement to be “satisfied by having 
import monopoly for all patented inventions.”294 Ultimately, 
therefore, the IPAB’s decision functioned to secure the local 
working as a basis for compulsory licensing under Section 84 of the 
Patents Act.295 
At the same time, the validation of the Nexavar compulsory 
license in India was more than just an endorsement of a traditional 
TRIPS flexibility. Indeed, more importantly, it opened a new front 
in the long-standing battle over national patent regime design in an 
age of pushing for the upward harmonization of IPR standards 
through free trade agreements.296 With so many on-patent drugs 
reaching India through import,297 a blanket prohibition against 
equating import with local working would probably not have 
withstood political pressure. The way in which the Controller 
General and IPAB’s decisions both broached and stopped short of 
prohibiting any such equivalence between import and local working, 
therefore, must be appreciated as the complex strategic maneuver it 
effectively comprised.  
3. India and Possible Compulsory Licenses for Other Cancer 
Drugs 
A dramatic series of events followed after the licensing of 
Nexavar. In January 2013 the Indian Government’s Union Health 
Ministry proposed to the Department of Industrial Property and 
Promotion (DIPP) that the Government should proceed to license 
three other cancer drugs.298 On the list were the biologic 
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trastuzumab, marketed under the name Herceptin by the Roche 
Pharmaceuticals-owned Genentech,299 Bristol-Myers Squibb’s 
ixabepilone, a tubule binding multi-drug resistant chemotherapeutic 
agent, and the tyrosine kinase inhibitor dasatinib, another Bristol-
Myers Squibb drug, which is used to fight chronic myeloid leukemia 
and marketed under the name Sprycel.300 Not surprisingly, the 
announcement further increased the torrent of recrimination by the 
pharmaceutical industry and accelerated efforts by the U.S. to 
reverse India’s course.301 Thus far, none of these cancer drugs has 
laid the basis for India in issuing its second-ever compulsory license. 
Indeed, significant legal blows were dealt to the cases of 
trastuzumab/Herceptin and dasatinib/Sprycel very quickly; in the 
case of trastuzumab, the DIPP even went so far as to declare that it 
would be ignoring its counterpart agency’s plea.302 
Even so, the controversy did not simply end. In August 2013, 
Roche unexpectedly announced it would not attempt to renew its 
Indian Herceptin patent.303 The company then promptly brought suit 
against the India’s Biocon along with the U.S. generic maker, 
Mylan, after the duo obtained regulatory approval to sell a jointly 
developed “biosimilar”304 version of trastuzumab on the Indian 
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market.305 Although the Delhi High Court blocked Mylan and 
Biocon from launching their generic Herceptin competitor in 
February 2014, other loose ends of the controversy persisted.306 
In February 2013, the Indian company BDR Pharmaceuticals 
submitted to the Mumbai-patent office the second ever application 
for a compulsory license in India during the post-TRIPS era, this 
time for dasatinib/Sprycel.307 BDR proposed to sell its generic 
competitor for Rs.8,000 (or US$130) for a month’s treatment as 
compared to the Rs.160,000 (or US$2,600) that Bristol-Myers 
Squibb charges.308 Once more official action created a roadblock in 
October 2013, when the Controller General of the IPO rejected the 
licensing application on technical grounds, refusing to consider its 
merits because of BDR’s failure to make out a prima facie case.309 
Exactly how to interpret this rather dizzying series of events is a 
complicated matter. On the one hand, the clear setbacks to the 
licensing of both Herceptin and Sprycel may indicate that the 
Nexavar decision will, in the long term, have less practical 
significance than it first seemed. Yet while political reality may be 
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pushing in such a direction, it is still misleading to make too much 
of this development.310 Indeed, even in the case of Herceptin and 
Sprycel, there was no simple reversal of the larger implications of 
the Nexavar decision. Already from January 2013, when India’s 
Health Ministry began urging the DIPP to issue licenses for 
trastuzumab, ixabepilone, and dasatinib, the basis it proposed for 
doing so had nothing to do with Section 84 of the Patents Act or its 
local working provision. Rather, the proposal was for the DIPP to 
invoke the “national emergency” basis for compulsory licensing 
under Section 92.311 In contrast to Section 84, Section 92 does not 
require the costly litigation step of filing a plea; instead, under 
Section 92 compulsory licenses can be issued directly upon notice 
from the central government for “national emergency, urgency, or 
public non-commercial use.”312 
Whatever the final fate of Herceptin and Sprycel may be, it does 
not necessarily limit the significance of the Nexavar decision. Even 
the failed attempt by BDR Pharmaceuticals to secure a license on 
Herceptin (which was pursued via the Section 84 route) was not 
rejected on its merits but only on the threshold issue of pleading.313 
Moreover, with the Delhi High Court’s decision, the battle over 
Herceptin has, in a sense, simply reverted back to Section 92. 
Indeed, the negative judicial outcome on the Section 84 application 
reinvigorated the Union Health Ministry’s calls to issue a direct 
government license and a growing rift with the DIPP.314 Of course, 
there is no guarantee that the Health Ministry’s position will win 
out—all the less, in fact, given that the DIPP, which is charged with 
taking final action, has clearly grown more rather than less hostile 
to invoking Section 92.315 
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Regardless, these events have reopened another crucial debate, 
as onlookers have been left to behold a major developing country 
potentially invoking the national emergency/extreme 
urgency/public non-commercial use basis316 of licensing. That 
another potential TRIPS-flexibility that had been dormant for years 
should come back to life in the context of cancer/NCD drugs makes 
recent events in India unprecedented.317 Therefore, even if the 
radical challenge of national emergency-based compulsory 
licensing does not come to fruition,318 the ongoing controversy 
around Section 92 is likely to shore up the nascent jurisprudence of 
Section 84’s “local working” that may have its own potential radical 
consequences. Indeed, the more that old battle lines are redrawn in 
the context of NCD drugs, the less likely it becomes that conflicts 
transpiring within those lines will easily be contained. There is, in 
other words, only so much of their reputational capital that 
pharmaceutical multinationals can spend in opposition, especially 
within any single country and especially as it becomes more 
apparent that the economics of the access-incentivization debate 
applies very differently to drugs for NCDs as compared to their 
counterparts for infectious diseases. 
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4. Ecuador and Licenses for Cancer, Arthritis, and Other Drugs 
Alongside Brazil, Ecuador has been the other Latin American 
country taking the lead in compulsory licensing. While many 
counterparts in Latin America allow for the practice, to date only 
these two countries have actually issued licenses.319 The legal basis 
for Ecuadorian licensing is grounded in Article 363(7) of the 
country’s constitution—obligating the state to guarantee availability 
and access to quality medicines.320 Further provision is also made 
through Presidential Decree 118 from 2009, which allows licenses 
to be “granted at any time for reasons of public interest, emergency, 
or national security.”321 Under Ecuador’s rule regime, requests for 
compulsory licenses must first be submitted to the country’s 
Institute of Intellectual Property (IEPI), with successful licensor’s 
then (possibly) obliged to pay a royalty to the patent holder.322 Under 
this procedure, the IEPI made its first licensing decisions—for 
AIDS/HIV drugs—in 2010, with a second round completed for 
additional anti-retrovirals in 2012.323 By the end of 2014, the IEPI 
had considered or was considering some 32 other applications, with 
nine licenses in total having been issued by that point.324 Among the 
applications were a high number for NCD drugs, including 
etoricoxib, Merck’s anti-inflammatory compound for arthritis 
branded under Arcoxia, Nucoxia, and Vargis; Novartis’ Myfortic, 
the sodium salt of mycophenolic acid, an immunosuppressant used 
in post-transplant patients; Pfizer’s sunitinib, a tyrosine kinase 
inhibitor used to treat several cancers marketed under as Sutent; and 
certolizumab, a monoclonal antibody used in the treatment of 
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Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis, which Belgium’s UCB 
markets under the name Cimzia.325 
Ecuador’s history of licensing since 2009 is noteworthy, not 
simply because it demonstrates a steady advance beyond HIV/AIDS 
drugs or even because the country has been able to avoid 
recrimination in a way not all of its counterparts have. The country’s 
actions also stand out because of the diversity of the NCD drugs it 
has moved to make available. The certolizumab case, similar to 
Herceptin in India, is of interest as it supports licensing in the new 
area of biologics.326 In this respect, Ecuador has taken the lead in 
questioning the norm of strict patent rights via licensing efforts 
beyond infectious disease drugs.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Part VI focused only on controversies involving two 
mechanisms by which developing countries have been shifting their 
efforts to contest the norm of strict patent rights in the context of 
therapies for NCDs. However, there are other mechanisms that 
developing countries are considering besides simply heightening the 
bar for patenting modifications and compulsory licensing. In India, 
for example, there has been renewed discussion around a twenty-
first-century version of price ceilings on pharmaceuticals. Other 
governments, like those in China and South Africa, continue to 
consider ways to revise their patent codes. In still other countries, 
the high price of cancer medicines has led to the possibility of 
outright patent revocation. 
At the same time, it is not only on the grounds of these shifting 
facts that we must now ask whether counter-harmonizing away from 
drug patents may emerge as a new norm rather than just a series of 
exceptions proving strict IPR the rule. Rather, this Article has also 
sought to show how these shifting facts make the ostensibly pure 
theoretical dilemma between the norms of access and 
incentivization seem less compelling than it has otherwise been 
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made to seem. Of course, this is not to say that the Article has denied 
there is any tension between access and incentivization—at least at 
some sufficiently high level of abstraction and provided that drug 
patents remain a cornerstone of our innovation system. 
However, by implicitly envisioning access solely in terms of the 
availability to the world’s poor of treatments for conditions that only 
or primarily afflict them, we have allowed an otherwise remote 
possibility—of multinationals becoming altogether unable to 
deliver therapies to the market—seem as if it is acute. As with 
ostensibly context-free normative reasoning in general, the access-
incentivization dilemma has thus carried an inherent tendency to 
facilitate status quo arrangements and directions of movement in 
law and policy making. 
Indeed, it is because of this reason that this Article has eschewed 
simply taking a traditional path of a normative argument for or 
against drug patents. By highlighting how the legal and 
administrative conflict in the developing world has tracked the 
changing face of its public health crisis more closely than existing 
discussion in the developed world, it instead urges decision makers 
to capitalize on the dramatic natural experiment now unfolding 
before our eyes. It is thus crucial to see that there has never been a 
better way to gauge whether departing from a regime of strict IPR 
will really push us to the brink of a world without medicines. Indeed, 
as the one example of infectious disease drugs that are close in their 
economics to those for NCDs has already shown, harmonizing away 
from strict patent rights has hardly prevented new forms of 
HIV/AIDS combination therapy from materializing. In fact, they 
have actually proliferated—much to the benefit of individuals in 
both the developing and developed world. 
In the final analysis, therefore, this Article’s plea is for policy 
makers to ensure that the natural experiment that the NCD crisis has 
created comes to fruition. In so doing, decision makers will be 
encouraging solutions that add to or even improve upon the best 
existing proposals for solving the ongoing drugs-for-the-developing 
world dilemma as it advances into its second generation of visibility. 
This is because existing proposals have tended to focus on actions 
by international institutions subject to a great deal of internal inertia 
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and political pressure from the major power holders within the 
international system than developing countries themselves face. 
Given the focus of these proposals, moreover, they also have the 
downside of tending to leave the supposed normative intractability 
of the access-incentivization dilemma intact. 
In contrast, the solutions this Article tracks are not only practical 
but also possibly more forceful insofar as they originate from 
initiatives that are already being implemented by ground level actors 
in the developing world. This Article has argued that it is those 
actors who have led the way in addressing the public health crises 
their countries face to reconsider the true ethical and economic 
burdens that remain if pharmaceutical patenting is the default.  
Of course, it may only be a coincidence that the shifting context 
of legal and administrative conflict in low and middle-income 
countries has ended up dovetailing with the unexpected popular 
support in high-income countries for renegotiating the terms of free 
trade liberalization. Yet, even so, law and policy makers would be 
remiss if they fail to see the great opportunity that exists within the 
seeming crisis the world order is now going through. As we garner 
better evidence about the consequences of deviating from strict IPR 
in the NCD drug context, we will only end up better positioned to 
rewrite the rules of our global innovation system in a way that makes 
sense for a twenty-first century that has moved well past its post-
Cold War antecedents. 
Finally, although this Article has focused on the policy-making 
opportunity that lies ahead to benefit the inhabitants of the 
developing world, its implications obviously do not end there. For 
decision makers here in the United States, it is vital to seize the 
opportunity that is now emerging to adjust the legal regime that 
governs pharmaceutical innovation and availability. Otherwise, 
inhabitants of the developed world will also be left, like their 
counterparts in the developing world, to face the seemingly limitless 
costs of NCDs. 
